ANNIE RUTH HOWARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Annie Ruth Howard was convicted of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest with violence. On appeal, she challenged the trial court's admission of a witness's prior conviction for obstructing justice, arguing it was improper impeachment evidence. The court affirmed, holding that evidence of the nature of a prior conviction may be admissible to demonstrate witness bias in appropriate circumstances.
Evidence of the nature of a crime for which a witness has previously been convicted is admissible to demonstrate witness bias in appropriate circumstances. The court distinguished between impeachment under the standard conviction rule and admissibility under the bias exception, which necessarily requires showing the nature of the underlying crime to establish the bias.
[1] Evidence of the nature of a crime for which a witness has been previously convicted may be admissible to demonstrate bias on the part of the witness.
[2] Evidence of bias is admissible to attack the credibility of a witness.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To show bias it is obviously necessary to show the nature of acts by the witness which evidence such bias. To do this it is necessary to show and explain the nature of the crime of which the witness was convicted.”
Establishes the court's rationale that showing witness bias necessarily requires disclosure of the nature of the prior conviction, distinguishing it from impeachment for credibility alone.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring Howard's trial for battery on a police officer and resisting arrest with violence, witness Green testified that police officers may have been t…
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HERSEY, Judge.
Appellant was charged with the crimes of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest with violence. During the course of her trial a witness (Green) gave testimony tending to show that the police officers may have been the aggressors. On cross examination by the state the following exchange occurred:
MR. FENNELLY: (Prosecutor) Isn’t it true that you have been convicted of obstructing the police—
MR. MASLANIK: Your honor, I object. That’s improper impeachment. And move for mistrial at this time. The state attorney knows what the rules of evidence require and he’s blatantly violated those rules.
THE COURT: All right, I’ll reserve on your motion. Go ahead and ask him the question properly. Have you ever been convicted of a crime?
MR. FENNELLY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime? A. (By Mr. Green) Well, as I was running for public office I was doing some campaigning and I was charged with trespassing. And one of the charge was dropped. The other told Mr. Hope about it and I think they seen fit — at that particular time I didn’t see where I was violating the law. Actually in my opinion by me running get into the race, go into the details of it, I was actually withdraw from the race and I thought it was politics motivation behind it, the reason why I was charged with trespassing. Some of the things. Actually that don’t have any bearing to me on this case.
A copy of Green’s conviction of obstructing justice was introduced into evidence.
On appeal appellant relies on Section 90.-610(1), Florida Statutes (1979) and Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1976) for the proposition that even if the limitations of the statute are met, only the fact of conviction may be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. It is appellant’s position that the nature of the crime of which the witness was convicted is inadmissible so that prejudicial error was committed when the trial court refused to direct a mistrial and permitted introduction of the conviction into evidence.
Section 90.610(3), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that the admissibility of evidence under Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979) is not affected by the limitations contained in Section 90.610(1). The former statute relates, among other things, to the right to attack the credibility of a witness by showing bias.
The testimony and record of conviction objected to by appellant were introduced to show that the witness, Green, had a bias or prejudice against law enforcement personnel. To show bias it is obviously necessary to show the nature of acts by the witness which evidence such bias. To do this it is necessary to show and explain the nature of the crime of which the witness was convicted. Thus we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that conviction of a specified crime may be introduced to show bias of a witness.
The trial court also determined, on the facts presented, that, in this particular case, the conviction of obstructing justice tended to demonstrate bias. This finding of fact comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness and is substantiated by evidence in the record.
We limit our holding to the facts of the present case and do not consider whether a similar rule prevails in the case of prior convictions of a criminal defendant. As to a witness in a criminal proceeding we determine that evidence of the nature of the crime for which the witness has previously been convicted may, under appropriate circumstances, as here, be admissible to demonstrate bias on the part of the witness.
Appellant’s second point on appeal is without merit.
No error having been committed by the trial court, we affirm.
DOWNEY and MOORE, JJ., concur.
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Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2004)…red into evidence. If the witness admits the conviction, “the inquiry by his adversary may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime for which he was convicted.” Fulton, 335 So. 2d at 284 (citations and footnote omitted). In Howard v. State, 397 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), a case concerning section 90.608(2), the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed the State to introduce evidence of a defense witness’s prior conviction of obstructing justice. The court stated: To show bias it is obviously nec…
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Strickland v. State, 498 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…at 695. In the present case, Ms. Stokes’ misdemeanor conviction did tend to show that she could have a possible bias against the law enforcement officers involved in the episode or a possible interest in protecting Strickland. See, Howard v. State, 397 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The nolo plea she entered was not a “nonstatement,” as asserted by her counsel, rather it was a formal declaration by the defendant that she did not contest the charge against her and admitted all the facts that were well pled.…
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Roper v. State, 763 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…e which qualified as proper impeachment under section 90.610. The state asserts that under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), it can attack the credibility of a witness by “showing that the witness is biased.” The state cites Howard v. State, 397 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), in support of its argument that its questions were meant to elicit relevant information that showed bias on the part of the witness. In Howard, a witness to the defendant’s battery on a police officer gave testimony tending to s…
Authorities Cited
- Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976)