STEVEN LEE SCHLANGER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence because the defendant failed to demonstrate he was seized or stopped, and the police contact constituted a consensual encounter, making the warrantless search valid under consent.
A defendant must initially demonstrate either that he was seized or stopped, or that police objectively interdicted his freedom of movement, to challenge a warrantless search; absent such a showing, a police contact may constitute a consensual encounter validating a warrantless search by consent.
[1] A defendant seeking to suppress evidence must initially demonstrate either that he was seized or stopped by police, or that police objectively interdicted his freedom of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice conducted a warrantless search of the defendant's luggage following a police contact. The defendant moved to suppress the tangible physical evi…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress tangible physical evidence because the defendant did not meet his required initial burden, Black v. State, 383 So. 2d 295 (Fla.1st DCA 1980); State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla.4th DCA 1975), to demonstrate: (a) that he had either been “seized” or “stopped”; or (b) that by objective standards, the police interdicted his freedom of movement or passage.
Consequently, the trial court was entitled to find that the police contact with the defendant constituted a cooperative encounter. Login v. State, 394 So. 2d 183 (Fla.3d DCA 1981).
Because there was no taint from an unconstitutional stop or seizure, the state was only required to show, by the preponderance of evidence, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), that the warrantless search of the defendant’s luggage, procured through his consent, was valid. The ruling of a trial court on a motion to suppress arrives in this court clothed with the presumption of correctness and we will interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions to be derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain the trial court’s ruling. McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla.1978).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Logan Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…l stop, the state was only required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the warrantless search was procured through the defendant’s consent. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Schlanger v. State, 397 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). There is no requirement that the defendant have knowledge of his right to refuse consent to the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Since we hold that the search did not violate…
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Wright v. State, 418 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…-setter, this concept is explained and referred to as a “contact.” Gomez v. Turner, 672 F. 2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (referring to this concept as an “encounter”); Schlanger v. State, 397 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla.) (“cooperative encounter”); Login v. State, 394 So. 2d 183, 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“encounter”); and State v. Rawlings, 391 So. 2d 269, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 11…
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State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…rance standard); United States v. Block, 590 F. 2d 535 (4th Cir.1978) (citing Bumper in support of preponderance standard); Finney v. State, 420 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (citing Matlock in support of preponderance standard); Schlanger v. State, 397 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (same). Second, Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216, simply did not eradicate, without the slightest acknowledgment, scores of cases which speak of the requirement that consent must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The r…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974)
- McNAMARA v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)
- Login v. State, 394 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Kajo, Inc. v. Kitchen Kabin, Inc., 383 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)