COMPASS ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
ALFRED H. EARLS AND ROSE A. EARLS, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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Compass Enterprises sought to foreclose on a mortgage given by the Earlses, who counterclaimed that a deed they had executed was a security device subject to redemption. After a pre-trial stipulation of facts, the trial court ruled the deed was a mortgage and entered judgment for foreclosure without hearing evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that stipulated facts and legal conclusions can be decided without formal evidentiary proceedings.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Where counsel stipulate to material facts before trial and no genuine issue exists as to ultimate facts—only a question of law regarding the effect of admitted facts—the court may rule and dispose of the matter without calling witnesses or taking evidence, provided both counsel have the opportunity to present evidence.
[1] A deed delivered to a creditor as security for a debt may be declared a mortgage by the court.
[2] A trial court may rule on stipulated facts without taking further evidence, even without a formal motion, if counsel agrees to proceed on those facts and is not denied th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court is justified in accepting and relying upon the admissions and agreements of counsel at such conferences and letting them control the subsequent course of the proceedings.”
Establishes that trial courts may rely on stipulations made at informal pre-trial conferences without formal written agreements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Earlses executed a note and mortgage to Compass Enterprises to secure indebtedness. They subsequently executed and delivered a deed to the same pr…
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COWART, Judge.
Appellees gave appellant a note and mortgage to evidence and secure certain indebtedness. Later, appellees executed and delivered to appellant a deed to the same property contained in the mortgage. Still later, when appellees learned that the deed had been recorded, suit was filed to have the court declare that the deed was a security device and that appellees had a right of redemption. Appellant answered admitting the execution of the note, mortgage and deed, but denying that the deed was executed for security and also counterclaiming for foreclosure of the mortgage. On the day for non-jury trial, counsel for the parties met in an informal pre-trial conference with the trial judge and stipulated as to the controverted and uncontro-verted evidentiary facts. The trial court thereupon advised trial counsel that they had the right to go forward with evidence but that he could rule on the stipulated facts that the deed was a mortgage, that appellees were in default, and that appellant was entitled to foreclosure. Counsel accepted the court’s ruling and stipulated as to the sums involved; thereupon the trial judge entered final judgment of foreclosure without taking evidence. Appellant discharged its trial counsel and appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by declaring the deed to be a mortgage without a motion and without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
Appellant argues that the stipulation of counsel on November 27, 1979, was not in writing and subscribed by the parties or attorneys as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.030(d). That rule was repealed June 14, 1979, effective July 1, 1979, In re Fla. Rules of Judicial Administration, 372 So. 2d 449 (Fla.1979), and, in any event, did not relate to stipulations of counsel made before the court. Although Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200 contemplates a formal pre-trial conference after notice and followed by a formal written order, in actual practice it is common for counsel and the trial court to confer immediately before trial, especially in non-jury trial cases, to narrow the issues upon which evidence need be taken. The-trial court is justified in accepting and relying upon the admissions and agreements of counsel at such conferences and letting them control the subsequent course of the proceedings. If it appears from such conference that there is no issue as to any material ultimate fact and that only a question of law is presented as to the effect of the admitted, agreed or stipulated facts, then the court and counsel need not perform the useless act of calling witnesses and the court may forthwith without motion rule on any points of law and proceed to dispose of the matter without the taking of evidence, especially when, as here, the court does not deny either counsel the opportunity to present evidence and proceeds without objection by them.
The final judgment of foreclosure is
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur.
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Robbins v. Dep't OF Natural Res., 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…a pretrial conference, may properly, on its own motion, enter summary judgment, partial or otherwise. See Roberts v. Braynon, 90 So. 2d 623 (Fla.1956); Bess v. 17545 Collins Avenue, Inc., 98 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1957); Compass Enterprises, Inc. v. Earls, 397 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Bartlett Construction, Inc. v. Coastal Plains, Inc., 353 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978). That authority of the trial court is in recognition of the fact that a pretrial conference might progress to the point where all questions…
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Fruhmorgen v. Watson, 490 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…a. 2d DCA 1985). Here, the trial court initiated and entertained summary judgment on its own motion, but did not do so at a formal pretrial conference where appropriate notice had been given. Appellee argues that Compass Enterprises, Inc. v. Earls, 397 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), approves the procedure followed by the trial court here. We disagree. In Compass, the court found that although Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200 contemplates a formal pretrial conference after notice has been given, in actu…
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Ferguson v. V.S.L. Corp., 528 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ence was adjourned and continued until the morning of the scheduled trial, some six days later, did not relieve the parties of their obligation to comply with pretrial conference procedure. See Fla.R.Civ.Pro. 1.200(b); Compass Enter., Inc. v. Earls, 397 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The state of readiness required of counsel for the scheduled conference was simply carried over to the continuation of that hearing on the morning of the trial. Because the trial court may entertain a motion for summary judgment…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 372 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1979)