ARTHUR JAMES EASTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1981-04-01
No. 79-1783/T4-722
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.
398 So. 2d 838 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Arthur James Easter was convicted of attempted robbery after a jury trial. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction on two grounds: (1) improper admission of victim's testimony about her fear of carrying a purse after the incident, which was irrelevant to the charges, and (2) the trial court's erroneous refusal to give a mandatory jury instruction on minimum and maximum penalties.


Holding

Yes. The court reversed the conviction. The testimony about the victim's fear on the day of trial was irrelevant because only her fear at the time of the robbery would have been relevant to the robbery statute. Additionally, the trial court erred in refusing to give the mandatory penalty instruction when properly requested, as the Supreme Court of Florida had held in Tascano v. State that such instructions are mandatory when requested.


Headnotes

[1] Failure to object to testimony at trial precludes appellate review of any alleged error in its admission.

[2] A victim's fear at the time of a robbery is relevant, but their fear on the day of testimony is not, absent a direct connection to the incident.

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Key Quotes

“the victim's fear on the day she testified was irrelevant. What would have been relevant was her fear at the time of the robbery, and the question in issue did not address that point.”

Establishes that the court found the admitted testimony improper because it addressed the victim's post-incident fear rather than her fear during the robbery itself.

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Facts & Procedural History

Easter was charged with attempted robbery in a purse-snatching incident. The victim testified at trial and was asked whether she brought her purse to …

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Judge.

ORFINGER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted robbery. He raises two points on appeal: (1) that irrelevant testimony was admitted which prejudiced the jury against him and (2) there was error in the refusal of the trial court to give the requested jury instruction on minimum and maximum penalties. We reverse.

The victim of the attempted purse-snatching, while testifying for the State, was asked if she had brought her purse with her to court that day. When she responded in the negative, she was asked why. The court agreed with the defense objection that her reason for not bringing her purse was irrelevant; the prosecutor then asked for a bench conference. We are not privy to what took place at the conference because the record reflects that it was held out of the hearing of the reporter. Following the conference, the prosecutor again asked a similar question, to which there was no further objection. The witness replied that because of the incident, she was afraid to carry a purse and would never carry one again. The failure to object to testimony precludes appellate review of any alleged error in the admission thereof. Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978).

Since this case will to be re-tried, we must observe that the questioning was improper. The State argues that it was necessary to show the victim’s fear to satisfy the dictates of the robbery statute,1 but be that as it may, the victim’s fear on the day she testified was irrelevant. What would have been relevant was her fear at the time of the robbery, and the question in issue did not address that point.

The Supreme Court has now held that the giving of the penalty instruction is mandatory when requested, Tascano v. State, 393 So. 2d 540 (Fla.1980), and that defendants who have preserved this issue for appeal have the benefit of that decision. The record shows that the instruction was requested by appellant and denied by the court. Appellant objected to the refusal of the court to give the instruction, thus preserving the point for appeal, and has raised it here as a point on appeal. We give the appellant the benefit of Tascano as we are required to do and we reverse for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.

COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. . § 812.13, Fla.Stat. (1979).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. State, 399 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …e served in insuring that a defendant who has requested an instruction has not later abandoned that request, see Smith v. State, 378 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), that purpose is adequately [*1002] served by simple objection.6 See Easter v. State, 398 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Meeks v. State, 400 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (in which point said to be preserved by objection; no mention of grounds). We hold, therefore, that where a defendant requests a specific jury instruction and sufficiently appr…

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