STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DANNY LEE LOWE, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's order dismissing all charges against a juvenile defendant as a sanction for discovery violations by law enforcement. The appellate court finds that while dismissal of some counts was proper under existing law, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a continuance and dismissing all charges, since viable alternatives existed.
The trial court properly dismissed Counts I and II under applicable law but erred in dismissing Count III and in discharging Lowe from prosecution. Dismissal of serious criminal charges is an appropriate sanction only when no viable alternatives exist, and here a continuance would have been a proper alternative.
[1] Dismissal of serious criminal charges or discharge of a defendant is an action of such magnitude that resort to such a sanction should only be had when no viable alternat…
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by refusing a continuance when discovery is provided on the eve of trial and a continuance would allow the defendant to prepare.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“dismissal of serious criminal charges or discharge of a defendant in a criminal case is an action of such magnitude that resort to such a sanction should only be had when no viable alternative exists”
Establishes the high threshold for imposing dismissal as a discovery sanction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDanny Lee Lowe, a juvenile, was arrested on July 31, 1979, on charges of sexual battery, armed robbery, and breaking and entering. After the case was …
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DOWNEY, Judge.
The State seeks reversal of an order dismissing all three counts of an indictment and discharging appellee as a sanction for discovery violations.
On July 31, 1979, Danny Lee Lowe, a juvenile, was arrested on charges of sexual battery, armed robbery, and breaking and entering. No certification hearing having been held within 21 days, the State nolle prossed the case and obtained a grand jury indictment containing the identical charges.
Without detailing all of the motions to compel discovery, orders thereon, and rules to show cause for the State’s failure to comply with the discovery rules, suffice to say that the Broward County Sheriff’s office simply did not measure up to its obligations to furnish discovery pursuant to either the Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Court’s orders in this case. As a result the trial judge elected to invoke the ultimate sanction for such recalcitrance and discharged Lowe from all pending charges.
The sanctions to be invoked for failure of a party1 to comply with discovery is a matter within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, and it is only with the utmost reluctance that we interfere with that exercise of discretion. However, dismissal of serious criminal charges or discharge of a defendant in a criminal case is an action of such magnitude that resort to such a sanction should only be had when no viable alternative exists. See, e. g., State v. Perez, 383 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In this case, Lowe had finally obtained the material he sought, albeit right on the eve of trial.2 At least three weeks remained before the speedy trial time expired and the State suggested to the trial judge that the defendant be granted a continuance of three weeks so as to fully acquaint himself with the newly obtained materials. The trial judge refused to grant the suggested continuance and therein we feel he abused his discretion. The only possible problem which could have been engendered by granting the continuance was a docket problem in reaching the case three weeks from the previously scheduled trial date. But if that eventuality came to pass, at worst the prosecution would be terminated by expiration of the time allowed for speedy trial.
Although the trial judge acted improperly in dismissing all three counts for discovery violations, we hold he acted properly in dismissing Counts I and II of the indictment under the rule set forth in Robidoux v. Coker, 383 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). However, he erred in dismissing Count III and he further erred in discharging appellant from any of the charges laid in said three counts.
We therefore affirm the order under review insofar as it dismisses Counts I and II of the indictment, reverse the order insofar as it (a) dismisses Count III and (b) discharges Lowe from prosecution for all three counts, and remand the cause for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and remanded with directions.
MOORE and HERSEY, JJ., concur. . The trial judge expressly found that the fault in this case lay with the Sheriffs Office rather than the State Attorney’s Office.
. While defense counsel exerted Herculean efforts to successfully locate evidence in the Sheriff’s files that might benefit the defendant at trial, those exertions were not engaged in until three days before the scheduled trial date.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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State v. del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…ounsel to appropriate sanctions by the court.” Although the choice of sanction is within the discretion of the trial court, see Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1971); McDonnough v. State, 402 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Lowe, 398 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); accord, United States v. Bockius, 564 F. 2d 1193 (5th Cir. [*608] 1977),2 the appellate court may determine whether this discretion has been abused, see Filgueiras v. State, 291 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d…1 / 2
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State v. S.M.F., 546 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…lar charge, dismissal is a very harsh penalty to impose upon the State and is reserved for those instances where no viable alternative exists. State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Pla. 3d DCA), review denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1984); State v. Lowe, 398 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Procedurally, what could the court have done? At this point, the trial court had several viable alternatives. In this case, the trial court chose to dismiss the charges for lack of prosecution. Unfortunately, under these circum…
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State v. Evans, 418 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…action for lack of prosecution. The state immediately objected, again stressing its willingness to proceed to trial. The trial court adhered to its earlier ruling, but did grant a motion to extend speedy trial time pending appeal. In State v. Lowe, 398 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the prosecutor failed to comply with certain discovery orders until the eve of trial. Three weeks remained before speedy trial time expired. The state moved for a continuance. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed the…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Seymour Piken v. Robert Butterworth as Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 383 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- State v. Perez, 383 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)