RICKY POWELL, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By (13 total)

• Apolinari v. The Honorable Ray E. Ulmer, Jr., 483 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
  …the motion for discharge states that this continuance had the effect of removing the case from the speedy trial rule. Contrary to this assertion, speedy trial was not extended at that time, and it cannot be extended retroactively. Durrance v. Rudd, 398 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In fact, the trial court expressed some skepticism that the witness’ vacation plans would constitute “exceptional circumstances” as defined by rule 3.191(f). The November 18 trial date appears to have been chosen deliberately to…
• State v. Ryder, 449 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
  …icable and defendant acquired the right to be retried within ninety days of the order declaring a mistrial. State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971 (Fla.1981). This rule acts independently of the general 180-day limit of rule 3.191(a)(1). Durrance v. Rudd, 398 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). To extend the defendant’s pretrial waiver to an independent right afforded him under rule 3.191(g) would be inconsistent with Dur-rance and Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980). In Fluellen, the supreme court recog…
• Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
  …tion for discharge, whereupon the appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion for discharge. We find that the motion should have been granted. As we held in the recent case of Durrance v. Rudd, 398 So. 2d 1012, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981): [W]e conclude that a continuance alone does not toll the speedy trial time. What is required is an order entered before the time limit expires, specifically extending or tolling the speedy trial requirements, (footnote om…

Authorities Cited

• Arnett v. State, 397 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)