ANGELA FAZIO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed an involuntary commitment order because the trial court violated the appellant's constitutional due process rights and statutory requirements under Florida's mental health commitment statute.
An involuntary commitment order must be reversed when the trial court fails to provide counsel, inform the person of their right to independent mental health examination, adequately document the illness, record the hearing, and consider the least restrictive alternative.
[1] An involuntary commitment order must comply with statutory requirements including providing counsel, informing the person of their right to independent mental health exam…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court must afford all persons all statutory and constitutional rights to which they are entitled, be they juveniles as in R. V. P. v. State, 395 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), or alleged mentally incompetent persons, as in this case, or any other person.”
The court's statement of the principle that all persons, regardless of status, are entitled to full statutory and constitutional protections in legal proceedings.
Angela Fazio was ordered involuntarily committed to a mental treatment facility based on allegations that she was ill and likely to injure herself or …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from an order confining appellant under the provisions of section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1979). It was alleged appellant was ill, was likely to injure herself or others and needed to be placed involuntarily in a treatment facility. It is alleged by appellant that the trial court violated basic constitutional due process rights by failure to allow legal counsel for appellant or to require a proper waiver of counsel; failure to inform appellant of her right to independent examination by her own mental health professional as required by section 394.467(3), Florida Statutes; failure to adequately document the nature and extent of the illness as required by section 394.467(3), Florida Statutes; failure to record the hearing so that an effective mode of review is obtainable; and failure to provide the least restrictive alternative available for the proper treatment and care of appellant.
The State of Florida has agreed “with the position of appellant that the involuntary commitment proceedings in the lower court are defective, both under section 394.467(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), and constitutionally.”
We also agree. The order of the trial court is reversed and the appellant is discharged. The court must afford all persons all statutory and constitutional rights to which they are entitled, be they juveniles as in R. V. P. v. State, 395 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), or alleged mentally incompetent persons, as in this case, or any other person.
ORDER REVERSED; APPELLANT DISCHARGED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Caudle v. State, 478 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…te of the fact that appellant has been released from the involuntary commitment. The state agrees that the commitment order was erroneously entered without providing an independent expert examination of appellant who is indigent. See Fazio v. State, 399 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). State has not argued that the issue is moot. In order to grant the relief sought by the parties, the appealed order must first be reversed. While we are not necessarily required to acquiesce in the parties’ stipulation, we fin…
Authorities Cited
- In the Interest of R. v. P., 395 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)