ROSA LEE REEDER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Rosa Lee Reeder was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, but the jury found she did not use a firearm during the offense. On appeal, she challenged the verdict as inherently inconsistent, arguing that guilt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon necessarily requires use of a firearm. The court affirmed, finding the verdict logically consistent because the jury could have found the assault involved a deadly weapon but not a statutory 'firearm.'
The verdict is not defective or inherently inconsistent. A jury could rationally find that an assault occurred with a deadly weapon but that the object did not meet the statutory definition of 'firearm,' or that the assault involved threatening violence with a deadly weapon without actually firing it.
[1] A jury verdict finding a defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but also finding that the defendant did not use a firearm is not inherently inconsist…
[2] A jury may find that an assault occurred with a deadly weapon without finding that the weapon used meets the statutory definition of a "firearm."
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The jury could have found that an assault occurred and that the pistol or object used constituted a deadly weapon but that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pistol met the statutory definition of a 'firearm.'”
Explains how the verdict is logically consistent by distinguishing between 'deadly weapon' and statutory 'firearm'
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReeder was charged with aggravated assault under Florida Statutes section 784.021(l)(a), specifically with assault using a deadly weapon—a pistol. The…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Definition Of 'Firearm' cases and more on FLexlaw
COWART, Judge.
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault, a violation of section 784.021(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), with the information alleging an assault with a deadly weapon “to-wit: a pistol.” Apparently in an attempt to implement section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1979), the trial court instructed the jury that punishment for the crime was greater if during the commission of the crime the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens to use or attempts to use a firearm and submitted verdict forms that included a form for the finding of guilt of aggravated assault as charged with the further proviso in the verdict form for the jury to find that in the commission of said offense the defendant either did or did not use a firearm. The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault as charged but also found that during the commission of the offense she did not use a firearm. This appeal is based on a claim that the jury verdict is defective because it is inherently inconsistent.
First we observe that punishment for this type of aggravated assault is not subject to enhancement under section 775.-087(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Williams v. State, 358 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). See also Bell v. State, 394 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) [1981 F.L.W. 541].
The jury could have found that an assault occurred and that the pistol or object used constituted a deadly weapon but that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pistol met the statutory definition of a “firearm.” See § 790.001(6), Fla.Stat. (1979); Goswick v. State, 143 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1962); Warren v. State, 332 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The jury could also have considered that the aggravated assault occurred as a result of the accused merely threatening to do violence to the person of another with a deadly weapon but have reckoned that to “use a firearm” meant to fire or discharge it. More likely this case illustrates that when criminal procedure directs the jury to concern itself with both the truth of the charges and the consequences of its verdict, its findings as to guilt and its findings relating to matters that legally require a consequence deemed by the jury undesirable, may naturally be inconsistent. Such inconsistency is the price of a “jury pardon” philosophy.
Although expressly extended an opportunity, appellant made no objection as to the form of the verdict before submission to the jury or after the jury returned but before the jury was discharged. We find substantial competent evidence supporting the verdict and do not find the superfluous additional findings of fact sufficient to impeach or invalidate the truth of the verdict.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Wooten v. State, 404 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ession be set aside. Contra, Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review granted, Fla. Case no. 59,302 (1981); Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1975); but cf., Reeder v. State, 399 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Thus, notwithstanding the clearly-expressed contrary intent of the legislature, and, in many cases, of the jury as well, § 790.07 has judicially been rendered entirely ineffective. .This case is thus entirely distinguishable fr…
-
Bufford v. State, 473 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)….”); 4 Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, § 575 (C. Torcia ed. 1976); Annot, 18 A.L.R.3d 259 (1968). In Florida, courts have observed that an inconsistency in verdicts is the price for investing the jury with mercy dispensing powers. See Reeder v. State, 399 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Damon v. State, 397 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Further, the preservation of the jury “pardon power” is the basis for the rule that the jury must be charged on all necessarily lesser included offenses. See State v. Thomas, 3…
-
Sanders v. State, 847 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…y.”); 4 Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, § 575 (C. Torcia ed.1976); Annot, 18 A.L.R.3d 259 (1968). In Florida, courts have observed that an inconsistency in verdicts is the price for investing the jury with mercy dispensing powers. See Reeder v. State, 399 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Damon v. State, 397 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Further, the preservation of the jury “pardon power” is the basis for the rule that the jury must be charged on all necessarily lesser included offenses. See State v. Thomas, 3…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Goswick v. State, 143 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1962)
- Bell v. State, 394 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Sargeant, 358 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Warren v. State, 332 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)