STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
W. E. T., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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The court held that the appellee, a passenger in a vehicle, lacked standing to contest the legality of a search that uncovered marijuana under the seat where he was sitting, as he disavowed any possessory interest in the vehicle or the contraband.
The state appeals an order suppressing marijuana seized from under a vehicle seat where the appellee was a passenger. The appellee disavowed any prope…
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ERVIN, Judge.
The state brings this appeal, contending that the trial court erroneously granted appellee’s motion to suppress marijuana seized in a vehicle where appellee was seated as a passenger. The marijuana was found pursuant to a search of that vehicle under the seat in which the appellee had been sitting. The appellee disavowed any property or possessory interest in both the marijuana and the searched vehicle. The lower court determined that the search was illegal and that the appellee had automatic standing to contest the legality of the search because the appellee had been charged with possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis in violation of Section 893.13(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1979).
Without ruling on the issue concerning the legality of the search, we agree with the state that the appellee did not have standing. The automatic standing rule has been abolished by both the United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) and in Florida in Norman v. State, 388 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The Salvucci court clearly held that a defendant could not obtain standing unless he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the [area]” where the property was seized. 100 S.Ct. at 2555. Here, the appellee had no such expectation of privacy in the area underneath the car seat because he had disavowed any interest in the automobile or the property seized. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Norman v. State, supra.
Accordingly, the order granting the appellee’s motion to suppress is quashed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LILES, WOODIE A. (Retired) and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Retired), Associate Judges, concur.
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Ulysses R. Williams v. State, 640 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…d, Nelson v. State, 578 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1991), he had no right to complain of its search since he was a mere passenger, State v. Deen, 625 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), and he disavowed any possessory interest in the items seized. State v. W.E.T., 399 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Thus, as in State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704, 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), “[t]he record fails to reflect that [Williams] had a lawful property interest in the automobile or the seized items, and there was no other evidence presented t…
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State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…d to establish that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile in which she was a passenger. The trial court accordingly erred in granting the motion to suppress. Acebo v. State, 415 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. W.E.T., 399 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith. HOBSON, A.C.J., and GRIMES, J., concur.…
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Tanya v. Griggs, 565 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…arch and seizure. On appeal the state argues that appellant, as a passenger in the vehicle, does not have standing to contest this issue. Although now relying upon cases such as State v. Bartz, 431 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and State v. W.E.T., 399 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the state did not assert this position below, but rather acknowledged that appellant did have standing. The pertinent inquiry in this regard encompasses a substantive fourth amendment analysis as to whether appellant had a reaso…
Authorities Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1980)
- Ernie W. Norman v. State, 388 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)