ALBERT JOHN MYLES, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Albert John Myles, Jr. was convicted of second-degree murder and involuntary sexual battery and sentenced to consecutive terms of 99 and 30 years. On appeal, the court reversed the trial judge's retention of jurisdiction as an unconstitutional ex post facto application of a 1977 statute, but affirmed the convictions and the voluntariness of Myles' confession despite his limited intelligence and literacy.
The court reversed the retention of jurisdiction as an ex post facto violation. The court affirmed the convictions and held that Myles' confession was properly admitted because although mental capacity may be considered regarding voluntariness, lack of mental capacity affects credibility rather than admissibility when the defendant understands his rights. Myles' borderline intelligence and limited literacy did not warrant suppression of the confession.
[1] A statute that attaches legal consequences to crimes committed before its effective date and affects the offender to their disadvantage constitutes an ex post facto appli…
[2] Mental capacity is generally considered in relation to the credibility of a confession, not its admissibility, unless it prevents the defendant from understanding their r…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16, constitutes an ex post facto application of the statute because this law attaches legal consequences to crimes which Myles committed before the law took effect and affects him in a disadvantageous fashion by in effect extending his jail time.”
Establishes the core holding that retention of jurisdiction under the statute violated ex post facto principles.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMyles committed crimes in March 1978 and was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and involuntary sexual battery. He was sentenced to 99 years fo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Mental Capacity cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
After jury conviction for crimes committed in March, 1978, John Myles, Jr. was sentenced to consecutive sentences of ninety-nine years in the state penitentiary for second-degree murder and to thirty years for involuntary sexual battery. The trial judge elected to retain jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) (originally enacted in 1977 and made effective June 1978). Myles appeals.
The trial court’s retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16, constitutes an ex post facto application of the statute because this law attaches legal consequences to crimes which Myles committed before the law took effect and affects him in a disadvantageous fashion by in effect extending his jail time. State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1981).
The remaining issue dispositive of this appeal is whether Myles’ confession was voluntary and properly entered into evidence or whether the statement should have been suppressed as a matter of law because Myles was of limited intelligence and functionally illiterate rendering him mentally incompetent to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.1
Although mental capacity may be considered in determining whether under the totality of circumstances a confession is voluntary, State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), the lack of mental capacity is generally considered only as it relates to credibility and not admissibility, see, e. g., Palmes v. State, 397 So. 2d 648 (Fla.1981); Reddish v. State, 167 So. 2d 858 (Fla.1964), and a confession will not be excluded on these grounds where it is shown that the defendant understands his rights, see, e. g., Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Lane v. State, 353 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
Here there is no question that Myles was read his Miranda rights. There is sufficient evidence to justify the finding of the trial court that Myles knowingly waived these rights. Even though Myles had the literary level of a first grader, he was found to be of borderline intelligence. The doctor hired by the defense to evaluate Myles testified that Myles was emotionally, psychologically, and intellectually competent to make a free and knowing waiver of his rights. Myles was not a juvenile, nor do we find any evidence in the record which would justify reversing the decision of the trial court. See, e. g., State v. Riocabo, 372 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), dismissed, 378 So. 2d 348 (Fla.1979). To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the State met its burden of proving that Myles’ statement was voluntary. We reverse with respect to retention of jurisdiction over the offender, affirm the conviction, and remand for correction of the sentence in accordance with this opinion.
. We note that the issue of voluntariness is reached here because Myles was in custody, was interrogated by the police and had been given the Miranda warnings.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1989)…ess or Admissibility of Confession, 8 A.L.R.4th 16, 24-28 (1981) & 3-4 (Supp.1988) (citing cases). This includes Florida. Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1100, 99 L.Ed.2d 262 (1988); Ross; Myles v. State, 399 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The question of voluntariness is, in the first instance, a question to be determined by state law, subject to the minimum requirements of the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 393, 84 S.C…
-
DeCONINGH v. State, 433 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1983)…trial court would have had to make the primary determination as to voluntar-iness. McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1973). . If this were the ordinary case, the district court’s conclusion would probably be correct. As stated in Myles v. State, 399 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981): Although mental capacity may be considered in determining whether under the totality of circumstances a confession is voluntary, State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), the lack of mental capacity is general…
-
State v. Delgado-Armenta, 429 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…. 1980), but would only be one factor to consider under the totality of the circumstances. Ross, supra, State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R. 4th 16 (1981). As this court recently stated in Myles v. State, 399 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981): Although mental capacity may be considered in determining whether under the totality of circumstances a confession is involuntary, the lack of mental capacity is generally considered only as it relates to credibility and no…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Palmes v. State, 397 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1981)
- Reddish v. State, 167 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1964)
- State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1981)
- Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Lane v. State, 353 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- State v. Riocabo, 372 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)