D. P., A JUVENILE, PETITIONER,
v.
DORIS CAPRI, DIRECTOR OF DADE COUNTY JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, RESPONDENT
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A juvenile was ordered detained in secure custody pending trial based solely on the trial judge's exercise of discretionary power. The Florida District Court of Appeal granted habeas corpus and ordered the juvenile's release, holding that detention authority for juveniles is strictly limited by statute and that no such discretionary authority exists under Florida law absent statutory criteria.
A trial court has no discretionary authority to order detention of a juvenile absent compliance with the explicit statutory criteria in Section 39.032(2). The phrase 'unless otherwise ordered by the court' refers only to pre-hearing detention orders and does not create an escape clause permitting discretionary detention after the detention hearing. Post-hearing detention orders must be based solely on the statutory standards.
[1] A juvenile shall not be detained in secure detention prior to trial unless specific statutory criteria are met.
[2] The phrase "unless otherwise ordered by the court" in a statute governing juvenile detention does not confer broad discretionary detention authority, but rather refers to…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a juvenile simply "shall not be ... detained" in the absence of the statutory criteria, none of which, it is conceded, exists here”
Establishes the core holding that detention is prohibited without statutory prerequisites
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile was taken into custody and, after a detention hearing, the trial judge ordered him placed in secure detention pending trial. The judge base…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
After a detention hearing, the trial judge ordered the juvenile placed in secure detention pending trial solely upon an exercise of what were said to be the court’s “discretionary powers.” By separate order, we have granted the child’s petition for habeas corpus and ordered him released forthwith in the custody of his parents, because no such discretionary authority exists under Section 39.032(2), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.).1 According to the express prohibitory language of the statute, see Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 1962), a juvenile simply “shall not be ... detained” in the absence of the statutory criteria, none of which, it is conceded, exists here.
Contrary to the state’s contention, the introductory phrase of the subsection, “[ujnless otherwise ordered by the court,” is not an escape clause which confers broad detention authority for any reason deemed appropriate by the court. Such an interpretation would have the unacceptable effect of completely nullifying the explicit language which follows. 30 Fla.Jur. Statutes §§ 134-136 (1974). Instead, the expression obviously must be read as referring only to an order entered before the detention hearing; it allows a court, but not an intake officer, to place the child in secure detention for that brief period, even if the Section 39.032(2) prerequisites are not met. However, the court’s order of detention after forty-eight hours, as in this case, must and may be based only on the Section 39.-032(2) standards. See Section 39.032(6), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.).
Habeas corpus granted.
. “(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a child taken into custody shall not be placed or detained in a secure facility prior to the disposition by the court unless:
(a) The child is from another jurisdiction and is an escapee from a commitment program or an absconder from probation, a community control program, or parole supervision for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of law, or the child is wanted by another jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of law;
(b) The child requests protection in circumstances that appear to present an immediate threat to his personal safety;
(c) The child is charged with a capital felony, life felony, or felony of the first degree; with a crime of violence, that is, murder in the third degree, manslaughter, sexual battery, robbery, aggravated battery, or aggravated assault; or with two or more serious property crimes arising out of separate transactions;
(d)The child is charged with a serious property crime; that is, burglary as defined in s. 810.02(2) and (3) or arson; or with the sale or manufacture of, or the trafficking in, a controlled substance; which is committed by an adult would be a felony; and
1. He is already detained or has been released and is awaiting final disposition of his case;
2. He has a record of failure to appear at court hearings;
3. He has a record of violent conduct resulting in physical injury to others; or