JOHN PETRIK AND CLAUDINE PETRIK, HUSBAND AND WIFE, PETITIONERS,
v.
NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, SUPERIOR DAIRIES, INC., A CORPORATION, RICHARD WILLIAMS, IRVING T. CHARLES, AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, AND DAVID PETRIK, RESPONDENTS; RICHARD WILLIAMS, SUPERIOR DAIRIES, INC., AND NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY PETITIONERS, V. JOHN PETRIK AND CLAUDINE PETRIK, HUSBAND AND WIFE, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over competing certification and certiorari petitions concerning whether a family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy prevents contribution claims under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the party adversely affected by the district court's decision did not seek review, and the other petitions failed to demonstrate direct conflicts warranting review.
The Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the certified question because the party adversely affected (Automobile Club) did not seek review, making the district court's decision final as to those parties. The petitions by other parties failed to demonstrate sufficient direct conflicts to warrant Supreme Court jurisdiction.
[1] A family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy does not bar recovery of a third-party contribution claim against a joint tortfeasor's insurer.
[2] A court lacks jurisdiction to review a certified question of great public interest if the adversely affected party does not seek review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Does a family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy control over the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act to prevent one tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another tortfeasor?”
The certified question of great public interest that the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to answer
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn and Claudine Petrik were passengers in their son David's automobile when it collided with a truck owned by Superior Dairies and driven by Superio…
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ALDERMAN, Justice.
John and Claudine Petrik were passengers in their son David’s automobile, driven by David, when it collided with a truck owned by Superior Dairies and driven by Irving Charles, Superior’s employee. David’s car was insured by Automobile Club of Southern California. The policy excluded coverage for “bodily injury to the named insured or a relative.” The Petriks sued Superior Dairies and its insurer, New Hampshire Insurance Company, and Irving Charles. These defendants then filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution against David Petrik and his insurer, Automobile Club of Southern California. David’s insurer denied coverage based on the family exclusion clause in its policy.
The trial court granted summary judgment against David’s insurer on the issue of coverage.
On appeal, the insurance company sought reversal of the summary judgment, contending that its family exclusion clause was valid and that it was not responsible for the contribution claim against its insured.
The district court, Fla.App., 379 So. 2d 1287, rejected this contention and, citing its prior decision in Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 371 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), it held that family exclusion clauses such as this one did not bar recovery of a third-party contribution claim against a joint tortfeasor’s insurer.
Pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1972), it certified the following question as being one of great public interest.
Does a family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy control over the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act to prevent one tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another tortfeasor?
Automobile Club of Southern California, the party adversely affected by the district court’s resolution of this question, did not seek review of the district court’s decision.
Therefore, even though the district court has certified this question as being one of great public interest, we do not have jurisdiction because the certified question has not been brought to us for review. As to these parties, the district court’s decision on this issue is final and is the law of the case. This is true even though we have subsequently quashed the district court’s decision in Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co. and answered the certified question contrary to the holding of the district court. Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 387 So. 2d 932 (Fla.1980). Pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1972), John and Claudine Petrik, in case No. 57,176, and Richard Williams, Superior Dairies, Inc., and New Hampshire Insurance Company, in case No. 57,179, seek to invoke our jurisdiction on the basis of alleged direct conflicts between the district’s decision and other decisions of the district courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. Neither petition is based on the certified question.
Having considered the jurisdictional briefs, we conclude that the district court’s decision on these other issues has not created such direct conflict as would warrant the exercise of our jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the petitions for certiorari are denied.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.330(d).
SUNDBERG, C. J., and BOYD and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…ily harm to them.2 The rule has continued to evolve and is now commonly referred to as an employer’s liability for negligent hiring and employment, see, e.g., Petrick v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 379 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 400 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1981); Abbott v. Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); see also, 379 So. 2d 1287, or negligent hiring and retention. See, e.g., Texas Scaggs, Inc. v. Joannides, 372 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla.1980).…
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Tallahassee Furniture Co., Inc. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…o establish what information the employer would likely have obtained had it made reasonable inquiry. See Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1241. This court in Petrik v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 379 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 400 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1981), recognized the rule as explained in Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), that an employee’s past driving record would be admissible to show negligent hiring or employment [*760] of a driver. The decision in Williams, 3…
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Iqbal Zabrani v. The Honorable Edward D. Cowart, 502 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…J., concurs. . The state did not seek further review in this case based on our certification. Such a certification is not self-executing and requires an application for further review by the aggrieved party. Petrick v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 400 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1981).…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1980)
- Petrik v. NEW Hampshire Ins. Co., 379 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Fla. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)