MAX J. RASHKIN AND EVELYN RASHKIN, APPELLANTS,
v.
DAVID C. PEARCE, APPELLEE
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The Rashkins leased property to Pearce and sued twice for unpaid rent and royalties. The court reversed a summary judgment based on res judicata, holding that the first judgment covered only rent accrued before the lawsuit was filed, not the entire lease period, so the second suit involved distinct subject matter.
The first judgment does not constitute res judicata because it was limited by legal presumption to rent accrued between the lease inception and the first lawsuit filing date, not the entire lease period. Future rent cannot be recovered in a lump sum in advance of accrual absent an acceleration clause, so the second suit involves distinct subject matter.
[1] Res judicata does not bar a subsequent suit for rent and other lease payments that accrued after the institution of a prior lawsuit, absent an acceleration clause in the…
[2] In the absence of an acceleration clause in a lease, future rent is demandable only in the amounts and at the times specified in the lease, and the total cannot be recove…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in the absence of an acceleration clause in a lease, "future rent is demandable only in the amounts and at the times named in the lease [and] the total cannot be recovered at law in a lump sum in advance of the accrual of the installments."”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that future rent cannot be recovered before it accrues absent an acceleration clause
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Rashkins leased property to Pearce for three years beginning May 31, 1973, with monthly rent of $1,200 plus royalties and expenses. On October 19,…
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HURLEY, Judge.
Appellants, plaintiffs below, contest the entry of an adverse summary final judgment. We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata was erroneously applied and, consequently, we reverse.
Appellants Max and Evelyn Rashkin leased certain property to Appellee Pearce for a term of three years, beginning May 31, 1973, and ending May 31, 1976. Monthly lease payments were $1,200 plus royalties on milk produced by Pearce and a portion of utility expenses and property taxes. On October 19, 1973, the Rashkins filed suit against Pearce for the rents due since May 31, 1973, milk royalties and utility payments. Judgment was entered in favor of the Rashkins for $24,471. Subsequently, the court denied a motion for rehearing which sought clarification of the periods of time covered by the judgment.
In March, 1977, the Rashkins again filed suit against Pearce for past due rent, milk royalties, utility and tax payments. Pearce filed a motion to dismiss, asserting res judi-cata. The motion was granted, but we reversed in Rashkin v. Pearce, 360 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). On remand, Pearce moved for summary judgment again asserting res judicata; and again, it was granted.
Appellee Pearce maintains that the prior 1973 judgment encompassed the entire lease period because in the first suit the Rashkins sought an adjudication of all monies due and owing from May 31, 1973, through the end of the lease period. However, the final judgment in the first action is silent as to the period for which recovery was allowed. Absent some definite indication to the contrary, we must presume that the trial judge did not grant recovery for the entire lease period, but rather, limited recovery to the period between the inception of the lease and the initiation of the lawsuit, i. e., May 31, 1973 — October 19, 1973.
It is presumed that courts know and act in conformity with the law. Ennis v. Giblin, 147 Fla. 113, 2 So. 2d 382 (1941). Furthermore, it is well settled that in the absence of an acceleration clause in a lease, “future rent is demandable only in the amounts and at the times named in the lease [and] the total cannot be recovered at law in a lump sum in advance of the accrual of the installments.” Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114, 20 So. 2d 346, 348 (1944). See also Hulley v. Cape Kennedy Leasing Corp., 376 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979); Aldridge v. Liberty Air, Inc., 210 So. 2d 279 (Fla.3d DCA 1968). We presume that the trial court was aware of this principle and applied it in the 1973 action. This being so, appellants’ present suit is limited to rents and other items which have accrued since the date of the institution of the first suit. Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., supra. Thus, the subject matter of the two suits is distinct and different and the final judgment in the first action is not res judicata as to the matters now before the court. Accordingly, the final summary judgment entered herein is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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First Cont'l Corp. v. Bashir H. Khan, 605 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…for an amount equal to the jurisdictional limit of the court in which it sought and obtained its double rent judgment, Landlord had no right to sue again for the balance of its rent in another court. Landlord relies primarily on Rashkin v. Pearce, 400 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA); rev. denied, 408 So. 2d 1095 (Fla.1981) for the proposition that prior maintenance of a claim for rent due in installments will not bar maintenance of a subsequent action. In Rashkin, like the present case, the demand in the October…
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First D.M.V., Inc. v. Amster, 545 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…on 725.01, Florida Statutes (1983). We find no error in the amount of damages awarded for the breach of the lease, there being no acceleration clause in the lease. Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114, 20 So. 2d 346 (1944); Rashkin v. Pearce, 400 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Hulley v. Cape Kennedy Leasing Corporation, 376 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979); Aldridge v. Liberty Air, Inc., 210 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). We also find no error in denying a set-off of the advanced rent against the damage…
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Rudolph v. Steinhardt, 721 F.2d 1324 (11th Cir. 1983)…he landlord has the option to re-occupy the premises or to stand by, do nothing, and demand each installment of rent as it comes due under the lease. See Williams v. Aeroland Oil, 155 Fla. 114, 20 So. 2d 346, 348 (1944); Rashkin v. Pearce, Fla.App., 400 So. 2d 541, 542 (1981). . Again, the Florida Court of Appeals reached the same result in REC Centers v. Shaughnes-sy, supra, note 20, 407 So. 2d at 972 n. 1.…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. Aeroland OIL Co., 155 Fla. 114 (Fla. 1944)
- Hulley v. Cape Kennedy Leasing Corp., 376 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)
- Ennis v. Giblin, 147 Fla. 113 (Fla. 1941)
- Rashkin v. Pearce, 360 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Aldridge v. Liberty AIR, Inc., 210 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)