HARLEY MATHIS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHNNIE BAKER MATHIS, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
HUGH O'REILLY AND CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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In a vehicle accident negligence action, the trial court erroneously excluded plaintiff's expert testimony comparing the factual bases and methodologies underlying the dueling expert opinions on the defendant's vehicle speed. The appellate court reversed, holding that such comparative testimony helps the jury evaluate conflicting expert opinions and that the exclusion was not harmless error.
The court properly excluded testimony asking plaintiff's expert to express an opinion on the validity of defendant's expert's opinion, but improperly excluded testimony in which plaintiff's expert would delineate and compare the computational bases, factors, formulae, and rationale underlying the two differing opinions. Additionally, if properly based on evidence, plaintiff's expert should have been permitted to express an opinion regarding the braking force of defendant's truck.
[1] An expert witness may be permitted to explain the differences between their own computations and those of an opposing expert witness to allow the jury to better evaluate…
[2] A party may question an expert witness about the facts, factors, formulae, and rationale used in their analysis and compare them to an opposing expert's analysis to poten…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Plaintiff's question in this case was couched to cause the plaintiff's expert to delineate the facts, factors, formulae and rationale used in the analysis leading to the defendant's witness' opinion and to do the same as to his own opinion and then to compare the predicates upon which the two opinions were based.”
Establishes the distinction between impermissible opinion-on-opinion testimony and permissible comparative methodology testimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA vehicle accident resulted in death. Plaintiff's expert witness in traffic accident analysis opined that the defendant's vehicle was traveling substa…
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COWART, Judge.
In the trial of a vehicle accident negligence action, the plaintiff’s expert witness in traffic accident analysis gave his opinion that the pre-impact speed of the defendant’s vehicle was substantially in excess of the lawful speed. During the defendant’s case the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert expressed an opinion that the speed of the defendant’s truck before the accident was just under the lawful speed limit. On rebuttal, plaintiff recalled his expert witness and asked him how the defendant’s expert witness’ computations differed from the computations upon which his (plaintiff’s witness) opinion was based. The trial court sustained the defendant’s objection to the question, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals. We reverse.
Plaintiff’s witness in this case was not asked to express an opinion as to the validity of the opinion expressed by defendant’s expert witness, as was held improper in Carlton v. Bielling, 146 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).
Plaintiff’s question in this case was couched to cause the plaintiff’s expert to delineate the facts, factors, formulae and rationale used in the analysis leading to the defendant’s witness’ opinion and to do the same as to his own opinion and then to compare the predicates upon which the two opinions were based. The result of such a comparison may show that defendant’s witness failed to consider all proper factors, or considered improper factors, or erred in the weight or effect attributed to certain factors, in the selection or use of formulas or in actual calculations or in other reasoning processes and thus might tend to impeach defendant’s witness, as in Hartstone Concrete Products Company, Inc. v. Ivancevich, 200 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), and King Pest Control v. Binger, 379 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
However, we feel the real value of such a question and answer is in giving the jury a better insight into the bases supporting the two differing opinions so that the jury can better evaluate and weigh the testimony of the witnesses by understanding and comparing how, why and in what particulars, the two expert witnesses reached different conclusions.
Additionally, if properly based on evidence, plaintiff’s expert should also have been permitted to express an opinion as to the braking force of defendant’s truck. As this testimony could have been decisive in this case, we cannot say the error in excluding it was harmless, therefore the judgment for the defendant is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.
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Carlyle Francis Dempsey v. Shell OIL Co., 589 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…and the distance at which they project. In restricting Dempsey’s cross-examination of Wattleworth, the trial court deprived Dempsey of the opportunity to show how Wattleworth’s analysis may have been incomplete or inaccurate. Cf. Mathis v. O’Reilly, 400 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. den. 412 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1982) (in vehicle accident negligence action where plaintiff’s and defendant’s expert witnesses in traffic accident analysis offered different opinions as to the pre-im-pact speed of the defendant’s…
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Young-Chin v. City OF Homestead, 597 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…n this critical and highly disputed issue, the trial court deprived her of the opportunity to explore the basis for the doctor’s opinion, and to demonstrate to the jury that his opinion may have been incomplete or inaccurate. Cf. Mathis v. O’Reilly, 400 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (error to prohibit questioning on the facts and rationale leading to an expert’s opinion), review denied, 412 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1982). Such evidence could have reasonably affected the jury’s verdict. Dempsey, 589 So. 2d at 379. Acc…
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Thomas v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 424 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…refusal to permit testimony of a rebuttal witness to impeach Lumbermens’ chief witness. Our review of the record discloses no error with respect to exclusion of this testimony. Unlike the impeachment testimony held admissible in Mathis v. O’Reilly, 400 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), the proffered rebuttal testimony in this case would merely have expressed an opinion as to the validity of the opinion expressed by Lumbermens’ witness, was cumulative to testimony preceding it, and would not have served in any…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Seymour Benson v. Benson, 379 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Hartstone Concrete Prods. Co., Inc. v. Ivancevich, 200 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Carlton v. Angus Bielling, 146 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)