REGINA DIFALCO, APPELLANT,
v.
INDUSTRIAL FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant challenges a summary judgment upholding cancellation of her automobile insurance policy for nonpayment of premium. The court affirms, holding that proof of actual receipt of cancellation notice is not required under Florida law when an insurer complies with statutory notice procedures.
Proof of actual receipt of cancellation notice by the insured is not required. Compliance with statutory notice procedures is sufficient to effect cancellation. The court formally recedes from Allstate Insurance Company v. Crawford, which had held that proof of receipt was necessary.
[1] A notice of cancellation of an insurance policy is effective upon mailing, even if the insured does not actually receive the notice.
[2] A court may recede from a prior holding that is in conflict with a Supreme Court decision.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is true that Allstate Insurance Company v. Crawford, supra, holds there must be proof of receipt of the notice of cancellation by the insured to effect cancellation, but this court has not followed that case since its inception.”
Establishes that although Crawford required proof of receipt, subsequent cases did not follow it, leading to implicit recision.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIndustrial Fire & Casualty issued an automobile insurance policy to appellant effective September 20, 1979 to September 20, 1980. Appellant failed to …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Notice Of Cancellation cases and more on FLexlaw
BARKDULL, Judge.
The appellant seeks review of a final summary judgment for the appellee, Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, holding the appellee had effectively can-celled the appellant’s automobile insurance policy pursuant to Section 627.728, Florida Statutes (1977).
Industrial issued an automobile insurance policy on the appellant’s vehicle, covering it for collision damage among other things. The effective date of the policy was from September 20, 1979 to September 20, 1980. The appellant failed to pay the premium thereon and, in accordance with Section 627.728, Florida Statutes (1977), Industrial sent notices on November 14, 1979 to the appellant and to the bank cancelling coverage effective November 26, 1979. On December 21, the appellant was involved in an automobile accident, damaging her automobile. Thereafter, she defaulted on the installment contract with the bank, which filed suit for the unpaid balance of the contract. The appellant answered that suit and filed a third party action against Industrial. Industrial answered, alleging the policy was cancelled for nonpayment of premium prior to the accident and it moved for a summary judgment. The appellant, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, alleged she never received notice of the cancellation. After hearing, the trial court entered the summary judgment appealed.
The appellant contends the trial court erred in holding there was a proper cancellation of the policy when there was no proof that she actually received notice of cancellation, relying on Allstate Insurance Company v. Crawford, 365 So. 2d 408 (Fla.3d DCA 1978).
We affirm on the authority of Service Fire Insurance Co. of New York v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855 (Fla.1955); Allstate Insurance Company v. Dougherty, 197 So. 2d 563 (Fla.3d DCA 1967); Burgos v. Independent Fire Insurance Company, 371 So. 2d 539 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Vega v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Company, 372 So. 2d 542 (Fla.3d DCA 1979).
It is true that Allstate Insurance Company v. Crawford, supra, holds there must be proof of receipt of the notice of cancellation by the insured to effect cancellation, but this court has not followed that case since its inception. See: Burgos v. Independent Fire Insurance Company, supra; Vega v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Company, supra. Therefore, by implication, the court has receded therefrom and we hereby formally recede from that holding. It is in conflict with the Supreme Court in Service Fire Insurance Co. of New York v. Markey, supra, and in violation of the pronouncements of Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.1973).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Boman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…roof of notice,” and cites Service Fire Insurance Co. of New York v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855 (Fla.1955), and its progeny, e.g., Woodcock v. Motors Insurance Corp., 422 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Difalco v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 400 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981): Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Simpson, 128 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), for the proposition that “convincing evidence of mailing is not rebutted merely by evidence that the notice was not actually received.” 83 So. 2d at 856.…
-
Woodcock v. Motors Ins. Corp., 422 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ompetent evidence that a notice of policy cancellation was mailed pursuant to Section 627.-728, Florida Statutes (1977),1 the insured’s evidence of nonreceipt of the notice was irrelevant. See Difalco v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, 400 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) and cases collected therein. The trial court correctly entered judgment for the insurer on the policy cancellation issue. On the cross-appeal we reverse the order denying the insurer’s motion to tax costs. The insurer twice sough…
-
Rugon Corp. v. AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. & U.S. Ins. Agency, Inc., 486 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…authorities, we affirm. Insurance Company of North America v. Sunrise Catering, 447 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Woodcock v. Motors Insurance Corporation, 422 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Difalco v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, 400 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Affirmed. . 5. That RUGON CORPORATION at all times from August 18, 1979, to the date of the death of Pablo Rodriguez on July 11, 1980, relied upon the expertise and guidance.of UNITED STATES AMERICAN INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., to…
Authorities Cited
- Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)
- Serv. Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1955)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dougherty, 197 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Burgos v. Indep. Fire Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 365 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Pilar Vega v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 372 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)