JEAN E. DUNHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
BREVARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD AND DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, APPELLEES
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Dunham appealed the dismissal of her sex discrimination claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act against the Brevard County School Board. The Fifth District reversed, holding that the trial court was bound by a prior Fourth District decision establishing state court jurisdiction and that the "election of remedies" ground for dismissal was procedurally barred and substantively inadequate.
The trial court's dismissal was reversed. The prior Fourth District decision established the "law of the case" that state courts have jurisdiction over Fair Labor Standards Act sex discrimination claims, precluding further dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. The election of remedies ground should have been barred as it was available but not raised in the prior motion to dismiss, and is inadequate because circuit courts have express statutory jurisdiction over FLSA causes of action.
[1] State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear sex discrimination cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
[2] A prior appellate ruling constitutes the law of the case and precludes relitigation of issues decided therein.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That holding is the "law of this case." Implicit in the mandate of the earlier appeal is the holding that the complaint states a cause of action requiring a response from the appellee. No other grounds for motion to dismiss are thereafter appropriate.”
Establishes that the prior appellate decision precludes further dismissal motions on different grounds
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDunham filed suit against the Brevard County School Board alleging sex discrimination in employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act. After an initi…
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SHARP, Judge.
Dunham appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing Count I of her second amended complaint on the grounds that she had elected her remedy by participating in an administrative proceeding after this suit was filed, and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Count I alleged a cause of action against the Brevard County School Board for sex discrimination in employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act1 of 1938 as amended 1977. In a prior appeal the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear sex discrimination cases under this federal law,2 and that the trial court erred in dismissing this cause of action.
That holding is the “law of this case.” Implicit in the mandate of the earli er appeal is the holding that the complaint states a cause of action requiring a response from the appellee. No other grounds for motion to dismiss are thereafter appropriate. Sax Enterprises v. David and Dash, 107 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1958); S/D Enterprises v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 375 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Goodman v. Olsen, 365 So. 2d 393 (Fla.3d DCA 1978).
“Sovereign immunity” and “subject matter jurisdiction” were specifically argued to the trial court in the prior motion to dismiss and they were therefore settled adversely to appellee by the prior appeal. The “election of remedies” ground was available to the appellee for argument at the time of the prior dismissal, since the record shows Dunham had engaged in an administrative kind of hearing. It also should be barred.3 But even if it were not, it would be inadequate because the jurisdiction to consider causes arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act is in the circuit courts, not administrative tribunals, by express statutory grant4 and in addition, a violation of this law by “state action” presents constitutional issues which must be heard by circuit courts. Department of Transportation v. Morehouse, 350 So. 2d 529 (Fla.3d DCA 1977).
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and CO-WART, JJ., concur. . 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
. Dunham v. Brevard County School Board, 372 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140.
. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216 as amended 1977.
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Sarosh S. Dhondy v. Schimpeler, 528 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ess’s fee. By that restriction, we implicitly rejected the necessity argument. Our Dhondy opinion became the law of the case, thus precluding Dhondy from again presenting the necessity argument to this court. See Dunham v. Brevard County School Bd., 401 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); S/D Enters., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 375 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. SCHWARTZ,…
Authorities Cited
- Dep't OF Transp. of the State of Fla. v. Morehouse, 350 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- SAX Enters., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 107 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1958)
- Goodman v. Olsen, 365 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- S/D Enters., Inc. v. The Chase Manhattan Bank, 375 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Dunham v. Brevard Cnty. Sch. Bd. & the Dep't of Educ., 372 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)