DAVID RICHARD RUBASKY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 16-year-old appellant challenges his convictions for attempted first-degree murder and involuntary sexual battery on three grounds: electronic media coverage of trial, denial of his motion to suppress his confession, and imposition of adult sanctions. The court affirms the judgment and sentence on all grounds.
The court affirms all three holdings: (1) the electronic media coverage issue is moot because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Chandler v. Florida; (2) the suppression motion was properly denied because the trial court correctly determined appellant voluntarily waived his rights based on the totality of circumstances; and (3) the sentencing issue is not reviewable because appellant failed to raise the objection at trial.
[1] Electronic media coverage of a trial is permissible when affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
[2] A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress a confession will be affirmed if supported by competent evidence in the suppression hearing transcript, even if the confess…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellant expressly reserved the issue of electronic media coverage of his trial in the event that the United States Supreme Court reversed Chandler v. State”
Establishes that the electronic media coverage argument became moot when the Supreme Court affirmed Chandler
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, age 16, was indicted for attempted first-degree murder and involuntary sexual battery. A jury found him guilty of both offenses. The trial …
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SHARP, Judge.
In this timely appeal of a criminal judgment and sentence, the sixteen (16) year old appellant charges error in the electronic media coverage of his trial, the denial of his motion to suppress his confession, and the imposition of adult sanctions. We disagree with all three arguments and affirm the judgment and sentence.
Appellant was charged by indictment for the offenses of attempted first degree murder and involuntary sexual battery. The jury found him guilty of both offenses. The trial court adjudicated appellant and subsequently sentenced him to imprisonment for nineteen (19) years for attempted first degree murder and thirty (30) years for involuntary sexual battery, both terms to be served consecutively and with credit for time previously served.
Appellant expressly reserved the issue of electronic media coverage of his trial in the event that the United States Supreme Court reversed Chandler v. State, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla.1979). However, appellee correctly notes that on January 26, 1981, the Supreme Court affirmed the Chandler decision. Chandler v. Florida, - U.S. ——, 101 S.Ct. 802, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981). Therefore, appellant’s first argument is moot.
Prior to trial appellant moved to suppress a confession he made after being advised of his constitutional rights at a juvenile detention center. The trial court denied the motion and overruled appellant’s renewed objection after determining that the totality of the circumstances showed appellant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and to consult an attorney. Although the tape and transcript of the interrogation and confession were not included in the appellate record, the trial court’s determination is supported by competent evidence in the transcript of the suppression hearing and we reject appellant’s second argument. See State v. F. E. J., 399 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Appellant also argues that his sentence is an adult sanction imposed without consideration of the criteria included in section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1979). However, appellant did not raise this objection before the trial court and therefore we will not consider the merits of this procedural question.1 See Jones v. State, 384 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 1375 (Fla.1980); Smith v. State, 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA), approved, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla.1980). Accordingly the judgment and sentence are affirmed without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek appropriate relief, e. g., through Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Smith v. State, supra.
AFFIRMED.
COBB and COWART, JJ., concur. . Other appellate courts are divided on the issue of applying the sentencing procedures in section 39.111, Florida Statutes (1979) to juveniles who have been charged by indictment. See Stancil v. State, No. 80-2008 (Fla. 2d DCA May 27, 1981); Goodson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Schroeder v. State, 391 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). This question has been certified by the First District Court, Goodson v. State, No. 59,864 (Fla., filed Oct. 27, 1980), and was argued before the Florida Supreme Court on March 4, 1981.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Monarca v. State, 412 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…ted to the trial court’s failure to follow the procedures set out in section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979). Thus appellant has waived this issue for appellate purposes. See Greene v. State, 403 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Rubasky v. State, 401 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The judgments and sentences are affirmed without prejudice to appellant raising his alleged sentencing error with the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedu…
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Glenn v. State, 411 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…g the findings of fact required by section 39.111(6)(d) and (j). There was no objection made below to the court’s imposing an adult penalty, nor to the absence of a written order; thus, this case falls squarely within the ambit of Rubasky v. State, 401 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) and Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). In the record before us, the only objection made by appellant was to the retention of jurisdiction by the trial court. There was no assertion to the trial court that it ha…1 / 2
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Burley v. State, 402 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…the trial court imposed adult sanctions without following the procedures set out in section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1979). However, this issue was not presented to the trial court and therefore it was not preserved for appeal. Rubasky v. State, 401 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are affirmed without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek appropriate relief, e. g., through Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (U.S. 1981)
- Goodson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Smith v. State, 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Eve Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Jones v. State, 384 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1980)
- Dunman v. State, 400 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Chandler v. State, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979)
- Schroeder v. State, 391 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Wilbur v. Wilbur, 399 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)