JAMES HARRY TOBIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief motion was properly denied because Villery's one-year incarceration limit on probation conditions applies only to incarceration and probation imposed for the same offense, not to consecutive sentences for separate offenses.
Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission's limitation on incarceration as a condition of probation applies only where incarceration and probation are imposed for the same offense, not where incarceration for one offense is followed by probation for a separate offense.
[1] Villery v. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of multiple offenses in a single information and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for some offenses followed by 30 years pro…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of the lower court’s denial of his Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. We agree with the lower court’s conclusion that appellant is not entitled to Rule 3.850 relief. Appellant was convicted of several offenses contained in a multiple-count information, and sentenced to a total of 10 years imprisonment for some offenses, followed by 30 years probation for various other offenses. In Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1981) (revised opinion), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the maximum period of incarceration which may be imposed as a condition of probation is up to, but not including, one year. The Villery court further indicated that this rule also applies to incarceration followed by a specified period of probation. However, we conclude that Villery applies only where incarceration and probation are imposed for the same offense,1 and does not prohibit incarceration for a year (or more) followed by a period of probation imposed for a separate offense, as in the present case.
The order appealed is affirmed.
SHAW, WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Note the Villery court’s suggestion that the legislature “never contemplated the concurrent operation of parole and probation for the same offense.... [e. s.]