LAWRENCE EDRIS QUARTERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed defendant's larceny conviction, holding that a reporter's exposure of a car for theft purposes does not constitute consent to the taking where the criminal design originated with the defendant.
A property owner's exposure of property with knowledge that a defendant intends to steal it, without the owner actively urging or suggesting the criminal design, does not constitute consent to larceny.
[1] A property owner's exposure of property with knowledge that a defendant intends to steal it does not constitute consent to larceny where the criminal design originates wi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A taking by the voluntary consent of the owner, or his authorized servant or agent, even though with a felonious intent, does not constitute larceny. But where the criminal design originates with the accused, and the owner does not, in person or by an agent or servant, suggest the design, nor actively urge the accused on to the commission of the crime, the mere fact that such owner, suspecting that the accused intends to steal his property, in person or through a servant or agent, exposes the property, or neglects to protect it, or furnishes facilities for the execution of the criminal design, under the expectation that the accused will take the property or avail himself of the facilities furnished, will not amount to a consent in law.”
Court's statement of the rule distinguishing true consent from mere exposure of property with knowledge of criminal intent.
Reporter Clarence Jones parked an old car on Interstate-95 to film it during its anticipated theft. Defendant Quarterman was charged with larceny of t…
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BASKIN, Judge.
We reject the argument presented by defendant Quarterman in which he asks us to hold that when reporter Clarence Jones parked an old car on Interstate-95 in order to film the car during its anticipated theft he consented to the taking. In Lowe v. State, 44 Fla. 449, 32 So. 956, 957 (1902), the court disposed of a similar contention by stating:
[A] taking by the voluntary consent of the owner, or his authorized servant or agent, even though with a felonious intent, does not constitute larceny. But where the criminal design originates with the accused, and the owner does not, in person or by an agent or servant, suggest the design, nor actively urge the accused on to the commission of the crime, the mere fact that such owner, suspecting that the accused intends to steal his property, in person or through a servant or agent, exposes the property, or neglects to protect it, or furnishes facilities for the execution of the criminal design, under the expectation that the accused will take the property or avail himself of the facilities furnished, will not amount to a consent in law, even though the agent or servant of such owner by his instructions appears to cooperate in the execution of the crime. 1 Bish. New Cr. Law, § 262; Alexander v. State, 12 Tex. 540; Dodge v. Brittain, [19 Tenn.] Meigs, 84. See, also, note to Connor v. People (Colo.Sup.) [18 Colo. 373] 33 P. 159, 25 L.R.A. 341, 36 Am.St.Rep. 295.
We agree.
Affirmed.
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Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…r vehicle, an express element of trespass in a conveyance, because consent is an affirmative defense to the crime of theft, otherwise lack of consent is presumed. State v. Wynn, 433 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see also Quarterman v. State, 401 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). There is, however, one element which trespass in a conveyance has that grand theft of a motor vehicle does not have, to wit: the willful entry or remaining [in the conveyance or motor vehicle]. Grand theft of a motor vehicle req…
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Deranger v. State, 652 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…h with felonious intent, did not constitute larceny. Loive v. State, 44 Fla. 449, 32 So. 956 (1902). The owner’s consent to give property to a defendant may also place the transfer outside the ambit of the current theft statute. Quarterman v. State, 401 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see also J.L. v. State, 566 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (juvenile’s honest but mistaken belief that she had permission to use vehicle required acquittal on theft charge). However, a person commits theft by knowingly obtaining…
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State v. Wynn, 433 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…of the facilities furnished, will not amount to a consent in law even though the agent or servant of such owner by his instructions appears to cooperate in the execution of the crime. Id. at 451-452, 32 So. 956. Similarly, in Quarterman v. State, 401 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), the court held that a reporter, in parking an old car on the highway for the purpose of filming the ear during an anticipated theft, did not consent to the taking of the vehicle. The Third District Court of Appeal in citing to th…
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- Lowe v. State, 44 Fla. 449 (Fla. 1902)