THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RUSSELL FORSTEN A/K/A RUSSELL FOSTER, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1981-08-04
No. 80-2281
Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ.
401 So. 2d 1160 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases


Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The trial court discharged the appellee on the ground, among others, that the state’s 120 day delay in bringing him to trial subsequent to the expiration of an agreed continuance violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.1 This issue “must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the particular case as a matter of judicial discretion.” State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla.1971), quoted and readopted in Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968, 970 (Fla.1980). No abuse of that discretion has been demonstrated on this record. Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1974) (100 day delay after state continuance found constitutionally unreasonable).

Affirmed.

. Because the defendant had previously himself both moved for and agreed to continuances, the provisions of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 were not controlling. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980).


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  • State v. Blankenship, 422 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
    …edy trial. In any event, the length of delay, standing alone, will not support the conclusion that constitutional speedy trial rights have been violated. Barker v. Wingo; State v. Bonamy, 409 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); but cf. State v. Forsten, 401 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), in which the discharge may have been upheld solely because of the passage of time, though the opinion does not foreclose the possibility that other factors existed. The second reason for reversal is grounded upon the rationale o…

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