CONCHITA PALMAR, APPELLANT,
v.
EMILIO PALMAR, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the wife and husband cross-appealed a final judgment, each challenging various awards. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in the awards for child support, attorney's fees, and lump-sum alimony, and rejecting the husband's claim that the second marriage was invalid.
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the awards challenged by the parties. The trial court properly determined that a valid marriage was entered into on June 11, 1978, and the awards for child support, attorney's fees, and lump-sum alimony were reasonable exercises of the court's equitable authority.
[1] A party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal if they did not object to the use of proffers by counsel as a means of determining child support at the trial…
[2] A trial court's determination of a valid marriage will be upheld if reasonable men could differ as to its propriety, indicating no abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The judge possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the parties and has available various remedies to accomplish this purpose including an award of lump-sum alimony.”
Establishes the trial court's broad discretion in dissolution cases to award various forms of relief including lump-sum alimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceConchita and Emilio Palmar were married on July 5, 1974, but that marriage was dissolved on September 30, 1974. The parties remarried on June 11, 1978…
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PER CURIAM.
The wife appeals and the husband cross-appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the wife contending there is insufficient evidence to support the awards for child support, attorney’s fees, and lump-sum alimony, and the husband contending that there was no valid marriage and no justification for the lump-sum alimony award of $37,000.
Conchita and Emilio Palmar were first married on July 5, 1974. That marriage was dissolved on September 30, 1974. On June 11,1978 the parties were re-married in Las Vegas, Nevada, a marriage the husband claims was never consummated. Prior to and during the interval between the two marriages, the parties shared a relationship with the husband providing support for the wife and a child born to the couple sixteen years before dissolution of the second marriage on May 29, 1980.
The husband stipulated to his financial ability to pay any award deter mined reasonable by the court1 and we find no error in denying the wife discovery of husband’s financial assets. The husband also stipulated that he would pay tuition for a private high school and for four years of college including travel and expenses. Where neither party objected to the use of proffers by counsel as a means of determining child support, we may not consider the issue raised for the first time on appeal. See, e. g., Hartley v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 339 So. 2d 630 (Fla.1976); Johnson v. RCA Corp., 395 So. 2d 1262 (Fla.3d DCA 1981); Allender v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Titusville, 389 So. 2d 1226 (Fla.5th DCA 1980); Jaruagua Enterprises, Inc. v. Dom, Inc., 339 So. 2d 702 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). Nor do we find here a fundamental error justifying exception to the above rule. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1970).
We find no error in the trial court’s determination that a valid, if short-lived, marriage was entered into by the parties on June 11, 1978.
The judge possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the parties and has available various remedies to accomplish this purpose including an award of lump-sum alimony. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no findings of an abuse of discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Where the record brought forward by appellant is inadequate to demonstrate reversible error the trial court should be affirmed. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979).
We cannot find an abuse of discretion in the $7,500.00 award of attorney’s fees to wife where counsel for the parties stipulated that such an award was reasonable and the record shows the attorney filed a complaint, an amended complaint and motions on behalf of the wife and participated in two proceedings before the circuit court of Dade County on behalf of the wife.
Affirmed.
. It is unclear whether the stipulation is limited to an award for child support.
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Cited By (13 total)
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Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…g that there was no competent evidence to sustain them. Wales v. Wales, 422 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). A trial judge possesses broad authority to fashion an equitable distribution of the marital partners’ financial resources. Palmar v. Palmar, 402 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Hartley v. Hartley, 399 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discreti…
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Granville v. Paulina Delp Granville, 445 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…urt erred in denying husband’s motion for protective order in that such denial would, in our opinion, result in irreparable harm that could not be cured on direct appeal.5 Cf. Alterman v. Alterman, 361 So. 2d 773 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); Palmar v. Palmar, 402 So. 2d 20 (Fla.3d DCA 1981). Accordingly, husband’s petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. THOMPSON, J., concurs. NIMMONS, J., concurs specially with an opinion. . The pe…
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Cotton v. Cotton, 439 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Horne v. Horne, 289 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In making that award, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances to insure equity and justice between the parties. Canakaris, supra. Palmar v. Palmar, 402 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); § 61.08, Fla.Stat. (1981). We hold that requiring the payment of interest, should appellant choose to pay the award on an installment basis or at some time other than immediately following judgment, is within the sound discretio…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970)
- Jaruagua Enters., Inc. v. DOM, Inc., 339 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Hartley v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 339 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1976)
- Johnson v. RCA Corp. & The Travelers Ins. Co., 395 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Allender v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Titusville, 389 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)