STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT K. WERNER AND JACK E. CARLSON, APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order dismissing cocaine trafficking charges and declaring the trafficking statute unconstitutional. The court held that the statute's use of "may" in authorizing post-conviction sentence reduction in exchange for substantial assistance does not create unconstitutional vagueness or unbridled prosecutorial discretion.
The statute is constitutional on its face. The term "may" does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague because state attorneys must have broad discretion in performing prosecutorial duties, and absent a clear constitutional violation in a particular factual context, the court will not intrude on the prosecutorial function by striking down the provision on its face.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face simply because it grants discretion to a prosecutor in the post-conviction information bargaining process.
[2] Discretion to initiate post-conviction information bargaining is inherent in the prosecutorial function.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“State attorneys are "the prosecuting officer[s] of all trial courts" under our constitution, and as such must have broad discretion in performing their duties.”
Establishes constitutional basis for prosecutorial discretion in post-conviction sentencing negotiations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert K. Werner and Jack E. Carlson were charged with trafficking in cocaine under Florida Statutes section 893.135(1979). They moved to dismiss the …
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ENGLAND, Justice.
Robert K. Werner and Jack E. Carlson were charged by information with trafficking in cocaine in violation of section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1979). This appeal comes to us under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution (1972), from an order of the trial court granting their motions to dismiss the charges against them and declaring the statute unconstitutional.
All but one of the issues presented by this appeal were resolved against Werner and Carlson in State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1981), and State v. Yu, 400 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1981). The one unresolved issue they raise is whether the term “may” in section 893.135(3) is unconstitutionally vague, since it vests the prosecutor with unbridled discretion when engaging in so-called “post-conviction information bargaining.” Subsection (3) provides that “[t]he state attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who is convicted of a violation of this section and who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principals.” Werner and Carlson claim that this provision leaves open the possibility that a prosecutor might secure “substantial assistance” from the defendant, and yet not live up to his side of the bargain by moving for a reduction or suspension of the sentence. While their concerns may be sincere, they do not provide a constitutional basis to invalidate the enactment.
State attorneys are “the prosecuting officer[s] of all trial courts” under our constitution 1, and as such must have broad discretion in performing their duties. Discretion to initiate the post-conviction information bargaining process is inherent in the prosecutorial function. Absent a clear constitutional violation in a particular factual context, we refuse to intrude on the prosecutorial function by holding subsection (3) unconstitutional on its face.
Additionally, section 893.135 does not directly abrogate the substantive rules of law governing plea bargaining and plea arrangements 2, and these rules should be followed, to the extent they can in a post-con viction context, by the parties and the trial judge. Good faith compliance with rules governing the plea bargaining process will prevent prosecutorial overreaching and alleviate any possible constitutional infirmities which might plague the unique procedure established by subsection (3).
The order of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. . Art. V, § 17, Fla. Const. . See, e. g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); Santo-bello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.170 & 3.171.
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Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…nded to apply to appellant’s conduct. The fact that the Act vests in the prosecutor the discretion to decide whether an eligible defendant should be sentenced pursuant to the Act does not render the Act unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Werner, 402 So. 2d 386 [*25] (Fla.1981). Accordingly, we hold that appellant has failed to establish that the Act is unconstitutionally vague on its face. IV. Equal Protection Appellant’s third and final argument is that the Act violates the equal protection clauses of…
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Domingo Antonio Madrigal v. State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ing so anyway. It is well settled in Florida that the manner in which a criminal prosecution is conducted is entrusted in the highest degree to the discretion of the state attorney. E.g., State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla.1986); State v. Werner, 402 So. 2d 386 (Fla.1981); State v. C.C.B., 465 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1981). That power specifically extends to sentencing questions such as the one involved in this case, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.171(b)(l)(i)(C) (prosec…
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State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1983)…981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 920, 102 S.Ct. 1963, 72 L.Ed.2d 436 (1982); State v. Newman, 405 So. 2d 971 (Fla.1981); State v. Leicht, 402 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 1611, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982); State v. Werner, 402 So. 2d 386 (Fla.1981); State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1981). . The 1979 bill was SB 83 and the pertinent references are: Journal of the House, Regular Session 1979, at 158-59; Journal of the Senate, Regular Session 1979, at 80-81, 83. The 1980 bill was…
Previewing 3 of 29 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1971)
- Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1978)
- State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. YU, 400 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1981)