THOMAS L. MYRICK, APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA JO MYRICK, APPELLEE
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The court held that a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a rehabilitative alimony award when a modification petition is filed before the payment period expires, even if the modification order is not entered until after the period has ended. This ruling allows courts to address rehabilitation failures without imposing unrealistic procedural burdens on litigants.
A trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide a modification petition for rehabilitative alimony so long as the petition is filed before the time for making payments has expired, even if the modification order is entered after the rehabilitation period has run.
[1] A trial court retains subject matter jurisdiction to modify an award of rehabilitative alimony if the petition for modification is filed before the payment period has end…
[2] The purpose of rehabilitative alimony allows for court consideration of extensions or conversions to permanent alimony when full rehabilitation is not achieved by the end…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The nature of "rehabilitation" is such that no court can ever be assured that it will, in fact, occur. If the awarded spouse has not reached the point, at the end of the prescribed period, where he or she can regain a useful and constructive role in society and maintain an appropriate lifestyle, the court making the award should be able to consider a petition by that spouse for an extension of the rehabilitative award or for conversion to permanent alimony, considering the appropriate criteria which would apply to all such controversies.”
Establishes the court's rationale that rehabilitation is uncertain and courts should have flexibility to modify awards when rehabilitation goals are not met.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThomas Myrick appealed a trial court's modification of a rehabilitative alimony award to his former spouse Barbara Jo Myrick. The modification petitio…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
The only issue before us on this appeal is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to modify an award of rehabilitative alimony when the petition for modification is filed before the payment period has ended, but the order modifying the award is not entered until after the period has expired.
The nature of “rehabilitation” is such that no court can ever be assured that it will, in fact, occur. If the awarded spouse has not reached the point, at the end of the prescribed period, where he or she can regain a useful and constructive role in society and maintain an appropriate lifestyle, the court making the award should be able to consider a petition by that spouse for an extension of the rehabilitative award or for conversion to permanent alimony, considering the appropriate criteria which would apply to all such controversies. Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).
In Lee, the court reasoned that modification of this_ type award would not be requested until the full rehabilitation time had substantially run or until other factors showing the non-attainability of that goal would manifest themselves. It held, therefore, that so long as any payments of alimony were executory, the court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for modification, notwithstanding that jurisdiction was not specifically retained by the judgment making the award. We agree.
The realities of calendaring in the trial courts makes it necessary to schedule hearings many weeks (and sometimes months) in advance. If we adopt appellant’s position, not only would a party be required to anticipate, long in advance of the running of the alimony period, the need for extension or modification, but that party would also be required to prepare and file a petition, arrange for a hearing and then somehow prevail on the trial judge to decide the issue before the rehabilitation period expired. The practical difficulties of this position are readily apparent.
We believe the better rule is that suggested by Lee, that so long as the petition for modification is filed before the time for making payments has expired, the trial court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the issues raised by the petition even after the rehabilitation period has run. The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the award here, so the order of modification is
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, C.J., and COWART, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Campbell v. Chalermsri V. Campbell, 432 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…not develop as anticipated within the projected term, through unforeseen or faultless circumstances, the receiving spouse may request the court to modify or extend the award or to convert it to permanent alimony. Canakaris, supra; Myrick v. Myrick, 402 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Other courts under similar factual circumstances have held that rehabilitative alimony was the appropriate award, rather than permanent. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Burkhart, 418 So. 2d 1…
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Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…court retains jurisdiction to consider a petition for modification or extension of rehabilitative alimony as long as it is filed within the period of rehabilitation provided by the final judgment. Section 61.14, Fla.Stat. (1979);4 Myrick v. Myrick, 402 So. 2d 452 [*230] (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Patrick v. Patrick, 399 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Reid v. Reid, 396 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), review denied, 402 So. 2d 612 (Fla.1981); Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 384 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review…
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Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ze is most certainly a change in expectation or, as we perceive it, a change of circumstance in reverse. We, therefore, align ourselves with the Second District decision in Lee v. Lee, supra, and with the Fifth District holding in Myrick v. Myrick, 402 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and hold that “so long as the petition for modification is filed before the time for making payments has expired, the trial court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the issues raised by the petition…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ranelle M. LEE v. LEE, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)