EDGAR PIETERS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1981-08-18
No. 80-1249
Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and FERGUSON, JJ.
402 So. 2d 531 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

A defendant who joins in a co-defendant's motion for continuance waives the speedy trial rule's 180-day provision.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was arrested and trial was set; his co-defendant's counsel moved for a continuance due to the state's failure to disclose a witness. Appella…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant entered a plea of nolo conten-dere to the charge of burglary and grand theft reserving his right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191.

Appellant and a co-defendant were arrested on October 15, 1979. Trial was set for November 26, 1979. On the date the case was scheduled for trial, counsel for the co-defendant informed the state that he was moving for a continuance due to the state’s failure to provide defendants with the name of an essential witness. Though contending that the continuance should be charged to the state, defendant joined in the motion for continuance. An excerpt of the proceedings before the court on November 26, 1979, reflects “The Court granted Defendant’s oral Motion for Continuance”.

By joining in co-defendant’s motion for continuance, defendant waived the 180 day provision of the speedy-trial rule though retaining his constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial within a reasonable time. If defendant had desired a more expeditious trial date he could have affirmatively demanded to be brought to trial within 60 days. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980).

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Fidel Gonzalez v. State, 447 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …el is apprised of a co-defendant’s motion for continuance, participates in subsequent discovery and takes no affirmative action that would put the trial court on notice of a desire to go to trial within the 180-day rule period. See Pieters v. State, 402 So. 2d 531 (Fla.3d DCA 1981); State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). There is no claim that the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. The speedy trial rule does not apply to a proceeding to revoke probation. Young v. Stat…
  • Redden v. State, 429 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
    …ial expired on November 27, 1981. He admits that if he obtained a continuance of the trial during that period of time, he would have waived his rights under the speedy trial rule. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); Pieters v. State, 402 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, he accurately states that nothing filed in the record during the 180-day period reflects at whose instance the two continuances were obtained. At the hearing on the motion to discharge, the state attorney emphatically s…

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