WELLINGTON E. BENEBY, APPELLANT,
v.
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Wellington Beneby, beneficiary of his wife's life insurance policy, challenged summary judgment in favor of Midland National Life Insurance Company on the insurer's affirmative defense of material misrepresentations. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that factual disputes regarding misrepresentations on insurance applications must go to the trier of fact and cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that factual issues pertaining to misrepresentations on insurance applications are within the province of the trier of fact and cannot be resolved on summary judgment. The parol evidence rule does not apply to insurance applications, and disputes regarding the extent of questions asked, accuracy of answers given, and scope of alleged misrepresentations are factual matters for the jury.
[1] The parol evidence rule does not apply to insurance applications.
[2] Factual issues pertaining to misrepresentations on an application for insurance are generally questions of fact for the trier of fact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the parol evidence rule does not apply to insurance applications”
Establishes the critical legal principle the trial court overlooked, which was dispositive to the summary judgment issue
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe insured signed a life insurance application on May 3, 1976, indicating she had no history of illness. Hospital and medical records showed she was …
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NESBITT, Judge.
Appellant who was beneficiary of his wife’s life insurance policy, seeks reversal of a summary final judgment entered in favor of the insurer on its affirmative defense that the misrepresentations of fact, which were material to the acceptance of the risk, vitiated the policy.1 We reverse.
The insured personally signed the application on May 3, 1976. Hospital and medical records presented in the insurer’s motion for summary judgment most assuredly established the decedent as a chronically ill and disease-ridden person. The insurer’s agent testified that he marked the answers with the insured who gave responses to the questions read to her from the policy which indicated she did not have a history of illness. The deposition testimony of the decedent’s husband is quite to the contrary. If believed, his version was that the agent hurried through the application and the only input the insured made was to sign an unread application.
We commence our analysis of this decision by observing that the parole evidence rule does not apply to insurance applications. 18A Fla.Jur. Insurance § 1010. The trial judge was apparently led into error because this principle was not brought to his attention. Given the inapplicability of the parol evidence rule and the factual dispute before the court, it is readily apparent that summary judgment was improvidently issued. The general rule is that factual issues pertaining to misrepresentations on an application for insurance are properly within the province of the trier of fact. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Sievert, 361 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Underwriters National Assurance Company v. Harrison, 338 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). This case is similar to the factual pattern presented in Travelers Insurance Company v. Zimmerman, 309 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) where we recognized that: (1) the extent of questions asked by an insurance agent; (2) the accuracy of answers given by the prospective insured; and (3) the scope of the insured’s alleged misrepresentations, normally constitute disputed questions of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact irrespective of how palpably false or material the representations may be.
The insurer attempts to support the judgment by relying upon New York Life Insurance Company v. Nespereira, 366 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Admittedly, the factual pattern concerning the long and persistent health problem and the apparent misrepresentations made by the insured in that case are quite similar to those before us in the present controversy. However, Nesper-eira, is readily distinguishable for two reasons. First, the controversy was disposed of after a trial; and, secondly, that decision was reversed because of the trial court’s erroneous ruling that the insurer was placed upon discoverable inquiry regarding the insured’s misrepresentations.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary final judgment in favor of the insurer is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
. Section 627.409, Florida Statutes (1975) provides:
627.409 Representations in applications; warranties.—
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless either:
(a) Fraudulent; or
(b) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or .... [emphasis supplied]
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Haiman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 798 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…as to both issues, we reverse. As to the first issue, materiality is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d [*812] DCA 1991); Beneby v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Appellant had two Rolex watches, only one of which was insured and was the subject of the loss. While appellant agrees that he initially misrepresented where he originally obtained the second uninsured watch, he corrected h…
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Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co. v. Sande, 421 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…eriality of the misrepresentation is a fact question. This is true when there is a dispute as to what was asked by the agent when the policy was issued or the accuracy of the answers on the application itself. Beneby v. Midland Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman, 309 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Mr. Sande acknowledged at trial that the policy application accurately reflected what occurred at his meeting with the agent; therefore, no factual dispute is pr…
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Patterson v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 564 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…ons of. fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman, 309 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). See also Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co. v. Sande, 421 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Beneby v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Therefore, the order, as it relates to the misrepresentation issue, must be reversed and the matter remanded for trial.4 Turning next to Cincinnati’s first issue raised on cross-appeal, we find a similar factual dispute ex…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman, 309 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- NEW York Life Ins. Co. v. Nespereira, 366 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Sievert, 361 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Earle A. Harrison, 338 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)