RONALD E. HINEBAUGH, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
CARYLE S. HINEBAUGH, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this family law appeal, the husband challenges awards of rehabilitative alimony, lump sum alimony, attorney's fees, life insurance maintenance, and the trial court's refusal to partition his office building. The wife cross-appeals the denial of permanent alimony. The appellate court affirms most awards but reverses on the alimony type and life insurance requirements, finding the trial court abused its discretion.
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony given the wife's inability to achieve the marital standard of living by age forty-six or three years thereafter. The requirement that the husband maintain life insurance for the wife's benefit was erroneous, though the court may order life insurance maintenance for the benefit of the minor children. The office building must be partitioned.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying permanent alimony when the record does not indicate the supported spouse will be able to earn sufficient income to sustain…
[2] A trial court may order a husband to maintain life insurance for the benefit of minor children during their minority.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under these circumstances it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to award the wife permanent alimony.”
The court's holding that given the wife's circumstances—sixteen-year marriage, lack of permanent certification, minimal earning capacity, and the substantial time before becoming self-sufficient—permanent alimony was required rather than rehabilitative.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for sixteen years and have two minor children. The husband is a medical doctor earning approximately $57,000 per year; the wi…
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[*452] SHARP, Judge.
The husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and the wife cross-appeals. The husband challenges the awards of rehabilitative alimony, lump sum alimony and attorney’s fees. He also challenges the requirement that he maintain life insurance for the benefit of the wife and the failure of the trial court to partition and award him exclusive possession of his office building. The wife challenges the court’s denial of permanent alimony. The court awarded her two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per week rehabilitative alimony until three years after the youngest child reaches majority.
We affirm the lower court in all respects except its refusal to award permanent alimony rather than rehabilitative, its refusal to partition the office building, and its requirement that the husband maintain life insurance on his life for the wife’s benefit.
The parties were married for sixteen years and have two minor children. The husband is a medical doctor earning approximately fifty-seven thousand dollars ($57,-000) per year. The wife has a degree in education and worked full time as a teacher to support the family while the husband completed medical school. The wife has not worked since the first child was born and she does not have a permanent teaching certificate. She plans to remain at home to care for the children, but does work part-time as a teacher’s aide earning two dollars fifteen cents ($2.15) per hour. It will be approximately twelve years before the youngest child is eighteen (18) and the wife will then be forty-six (46) years old.
The record does not indicate any basis to conclude that at that point or three years thereafter the wife will be able to earn sufficient income to sustain herself at a level that approximates the level the parties experienced during the marriage. Under these circumstances it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to award the wife permanent alimony. Patrick v. Patrick, 399 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Gerber v. Gerber, 392 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); G’Sell v. G’Sell, 390 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
At oral argument the parties stipulated that the office building should be partitioned and that it was error to require the husband to maintain insurance for the benefit of the wife. However, the court may order the husband to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the children during their minority. Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We reverse and remand for an award of permanent alimony, reconsideration of the life insurance question and partition of the office property.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
COBB, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.
COBB, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects except for the reversal of the trial court’s award of rehabilitative, as opposed to permanent, alimony. I would affirm the trial court in that regard. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Hair v. Hair, 402 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and G’Sell v. G’Sell, 390 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…rmanent alimony is appropriate in marriages of comparable length: Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Nelson v. Nelson, 588 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991); Hirst v. Hirst, 452 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Hinebaugh v. Hinebaugh, 403 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). . While the relative youth of a party when coupled with evidence of a party’s potential earning capacity may result in an award of both permanent and temporary support, in a situation where the potential earning powers of the p…
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Hurtado v. Rose-Jean Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ss of their marital status, if such is possible. It was decided by both parties, in better times, that the wife should be a full time mother; the husband has the means to see that objective fulfilled. So it shall be. See also Hinebaugh v. Hinebaugh, 403 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Appellant wishes us to compel appellee to return to work and abandon her role as mother and homemaker in order to lighten his financial burden, enabling him to do other things. Having abandoned the family circle he created in o…
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Shufflebarger v. Harry L. Shufflebarger, M.D., 460 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…. Fotorny v. Fotorny, 397 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Steinau v. Steinau, 343 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Second, a court may order a noncustodial parent to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his minor child. Hinebaugh v. Hinebaugh, 403 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA), pet. for rev. dismissed, 408 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981); Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Moore v. Moore, 311 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Even though a parent’s duty of support ordinarily ceases when a child reache…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- McALLISTER v. McALLISTER, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- McQUIGGAN v. State, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Hair v. Hair, 402 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Veroncia G'Sell v. G'Sell, 390 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Applewhite v. Kreiger, 392 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Patrick v. Patrick, 399 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)