SPECIAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, APPELLANT,
v.
STARDUST ACRES AND FLORIDA FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1981-09-14
No. YY-311
BOOTH and SHAW, JJ., concur., WENTWORTH, J., concurs with opinion.
403 So. 2d 597 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1981)

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Synopsis

The dissenting opinion argues that the 60-day filing limitation for reimbursement claims under Section 440.49(2)(g) bars an employer/carrier's claim for wage loss benefits because it was not timely filed.


Holding

The dissenting judge would reverse the deputy commissioner's order, holding that the employer/carrier's claim for reimbursement is barred by the 60-day statute of non-claim.


Facts & Procedural History

An employer/carrier sought reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for wage loss benefits paid to a claimant. The claim was filed more th…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BOOTH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

WENTWORTH, J., concurs with opinion.

Concurrence
WENTWORTH,

Judge, concurring.

I find adequate record support for the award of Fund reimbursement on the ground that claimant’s preexisting impairment contributed medically to the need for remedial care and temporary benefits here in question. § 440.49(2)(e), Florida Statutes. The alternative finding of circumstantial contribution is in my opinion an appropriate acknowledgment that the medi cal contribution was indirect (as opposed to medical treatment of the prior condition directly), based on testimony that the prior impairment, even if not brought to attention of the treating doctor, prolonged the period of treatment for and recuperation from the new injury. Although the statutory reference to medical or circumstantial contribution is alternative, and may well refer also to circumstantial causation or contribution other than medical as appellant argues with reference to the “but for” merger principle of § 440.49(2)(b)2a, Florida Statutes, the statutory terms do not preclude the reasoning reflected by the deputy’s order.


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