FRANK NUNZIATO, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LENA NUNZIATO, DECEASED, FRANK F. NUNZIATO AND GEORGE T. NUNZIATO, BY AND THROUGH FRANK NUNZIATO, THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, APPELLANTS,
v.
P & L AUTO PARTS, INC. AND SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Frank Nunziato appealed a summary judgment dismissing his wrongful death action against P & L Auto Parts and its insurer following a fatal vehicle collision. The court affirmed, holding that the negligence of the other driver (DeMoya) constituted an active and efficient intervening cause that broke the chain of proximate causation from Lorenzo's alleged negligence, making proximate cause a matter of law for the court.
Even assuming Lorenzo was negligent, he may not be held liable if the damage was caused by an active and efficient intervening cause. Here, DeMoya's conduct was the sole proximate cause of Lena's death, constituting an active and efficient intervening cause that was not foreseeable, making proximate cause a question of law for the court rather than the jury.
[1] A defendant may not be held liable for negligence if the damage was caused by an active and efficient intervening cause.
[2] The foreseeability of an intervening cause depends on whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“he may not be held liable for this negligence if the damage was caused by an active and efficient intervening cause”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that an intervening cause can sever proximate causation and shield a defendant from liability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLena Nunziato was killed in a head-on collision while riding in a vehicle owned by P & L Auto Parts and driven by Kenneth Lorenzo. Lorenzo had a blood…
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FERGUSON, Judge.
Lena Nunziato was killed while a passenger in a vehicle owned by appellee P & L Auto Parts, Inc. and insured by appellee South Carolina Insurance Co. Frank Nun-ziato individually and as personal representative of Lena’s estate, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of appel-lees in the wrongful death action below. We affirm.
Lena was killed when the vehicle in which she was riding crashed head-on while rounding a “S” shaped curve. An autopsy on the driver of the P & L Auto Parts car, Kenneth Lorenzo, revealed that he had a .14 percent blood-alcohol level at the time of the accident. The driver of the other car, George DeMoya, stated that a few hours before the collision, he had taken a couple of quaaludes mixed with a few drinks. It was estimated that DeMoya was traveling about 60 miles per hour; Lorenzo between 35 to 55 miles per hour. The posted speed limit is 30 miles per hour. DeMoya’s vehicle crossed the center-line almost five feet into Lorenzo’s lane. Lorenzo’s vehicle did not cross the center-line and the accident occurred in the lane occupied by Lorenzo’s vehicle. DeMoya admits to having dozed off to sleep shortly before the collision. In deposition, appellee’s expert witness testified that the driver of the P & L Auto Parts vehicle would have had one to one-and-a-half seconds to act after DeMoya’s car started to brake and that an oncoming driver could not react sufficiently to avoid impact in that period of time. The issue on appeal is whether the actions of Lorenzo were a proximate cause of Lena’s death.
Even if we assumed that Lorenzo was negligent in that he was driving with a high blood-alcohol level and speeding — although there is no conclusive evidence as to speed — he may not be held liable for this negligence if the damage was caused by an active and efficient intervening cause. See, e. g., Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla.1980) and cases collected therein.
There is no evidence that Lorenzo set in motion a chain of events resulting in death to Lena, see, e. g., Gibson, supra, or that the cause of the accident and the sole proximate cause of Lena’s death was other than the intervening conduct of DeMoya. Nor is this a case where the intervening cause is foreseeable. Cf. DWL, Inc. v. Foster, 396 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (intervening cause of foreclosure as a consequence of failure to pay mortgages, foreseeable). Whether the intervening cause is foreseeable depends on whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct. On this record there is no factual dispute as to question of foreseeability.
Where, as here, there is an active and efficient intervening cause, the question of proximate cause is one for the court. Nance v. James Archer Smith Hospital, Inc., 329 So. 2d 377 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1171 (Fla.1976); Kwoka v. Campbell, 296 So. 2d 629 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 450 (Fla.1974).
The entry of final summary judgment for appellees is affirmed.
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Walston v. Florida Highway Patrol, 429 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…car driven by Castillo as an intervening cause. The question, then, is whether or not the intervening cause was unforeseeable as a matter of law, justifying judgment by the court contrary to the jury verdict. See Nunziato v. P & L Auto Parts, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Pope v. Cruise Boat Co., Inc., 380 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The argument of the appellee attempts to avoid this issue by conceding that foreseeability is a jury issue, but contending that this issue does not arise in the…
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Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gibson v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)
- Kwoka v. Campbell, 296 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Nance v. James Archer Smith Hosp., Inc., 329 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Bader Bros. Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Campbell, 304 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1974)
- Baggett v. State, 304 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1974)
- DWL, Inc. v. Foster, 396 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)