DOUGLAS N. HIGGINS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA KEYS AQUEDUCT AUTHORITY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Douglas N. Higgins, Inc., the second-lowest bidder on a project, challenged the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority's refusal to grant it a hearing on the agency's contract award to the lowest bidder. The court reversed, holding that the appellant was entitled to a hearing because it requested one within twenty-one days of actual notice, despite the agency's failure to provide prior written notice as required by administrative rule.
The appellant was entitled to a hearing because it requested one within twenty-one days of actual notice of the contract award. The agency's failure to provide prior written notice does not eliminate the appellant's right to a hearing when a request is made within the twenty-one-day period from receipt of written notice or notice of intent to render a decision.
[1] An agency must provide written notice of its intent to award a contract to the lowest bidder to other bidders.
[2] A bidder is entitled to a hearing if they request it within twenty-one days of the actual award of a contract, absent prior written notice of intent to award.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The appellant requested a hearing within twenty-one days of the actual giving of a contract to the low bidder without any prior written notice from the agency. This entitled it to a hearing under the rule.”
Establishes that a timely hearing request within twenty-one days of actual notice of the contract award is sufficient to entitle the appellant to a hearing, regardless of lack of prior written notice.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellee advertised a project for bids. The appellant was the second-lowest bidder. The appellee awarded the contract to the lowest bidder without…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Substantial Interests cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, allegedly is the second lowest bidder on a certain project ad ver- tised for bids by the appellee. The appellee failed to apprise the appellant of its intention to award the contract to the lowest bidder, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 28-5.111, Florida Administrative Rules.1 Notwithstanding this failure, the agency refused to accord the appellant a hearing because it contended that the appellant had actual notice of the proposed award to the low bidder for a period in excess of twenty-one days; therefore, the agency did not have to give the written notice required by the rule and did not have to accord the appellant a hearing. We reverse.
The appellant requested a hearing within twenty-one days of the actual giving of a contract to the low bidder without any prior written notice from the agency. This entitled it to a hearing under the rule. The agency action denying the appellant a hearing pursuant to said rule be and the same is hereby reversed, with directions to grant the appellant such a hearing.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
. “28-5.111 Point of Entry into Proceedings. Unless otherwise provided by law or agency rule:
(1)Persons requesting a hearing on an Agency decision which does or may determine their substantial interest shall file a petition with the Agency within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of written notice of the decision, or within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of written notice of intent to render such decision; whenever possible, an Agency shall issue a written notice of intent to render a decision prior to the decision and allow persons who may be substantially affected thereby twenty-one (21) days from receipt in which to request a hearing. The notice shall state the time limit for requesting a hearing and shall reference the agency’s procedural rules.
(2) Any person who receives written notice of an agency decision or who receives written notice of intent to render a decision and who fails to request a hearing within twenty-one (21) days, shall have waived his right subsequently to request a hearing on such matters.
(3) The Agency may publish notice of its decision, or of its intent to render a decision in the Florida Administrative Weekly, newspapers of general circulation in the area affected by such decisions and may also, where appropriate, mail copies of its notice to applicants, competitors, and interested groups. Such action by the Agency may be used in establishing petitioner’s date of receiving notice.” (emphasis added)
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Sterman v. The Fla. State Univ. Bd. OF Regents, 414 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…e of such agency action which did not inform petitioner of his right to request a hearing and the time limits for doing so would be inadequate to trigger the commencement of the administrative process. See Higgins v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, 403 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The notices which the university relied on, in finding that the petition was untimely, did not provide appellant with a clear point of entry into the administrative process as the university was required to do. Capaletti v. State…