CHRISTOPHER TRENT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 'life felony' is distinct from a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, and the harmless error doctrine does not apply to minimum mandatory sentencing provisions that preclude parole and gain-time.
The case involves a youthful offender convicted of armed robbery. The trial court imposed a three-year minimum term under Section 775.087, Florida Sta…
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LETTS, Chief Judge.
This cause is reversed and remanded upon the authority of Richardson v. State, 398 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) which we adopt as the law of the Fourth District.
We do not like this result and entertain serious doubts as to whether the legislature ever intended such preferential treatment for youthful offenders who commit armed robbery. Nonetheless a “life felony” is most definitely a completely different animal from a felony in the first degree punishable by life imprisonment. See Section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes (1979) and Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
There remains the question of why it is not harmless error to sentence a youthful offender to a three year minimum term of imprisonment under Section 775.087, if the court could have sentenced him to six years, four of which could have been by actual imprisonment under Section 958.05. The answer is that under the minimum mandatory provisions of Section 775.087 we note that the prisoner is not eligible for parole or statutory gain-time. Accordingly, the harmless error doctrine is not appropriate here.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BERANEK and MOORE, JJ., concur.
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Mendez v. State, 835 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…r, the court is prohibited from imposing sanctions other than those of the Youthful Offender Act. Id. The record reflects that the sentencing error was preserved. We also reject the contention that any error, here, was harmless. See Trent v. State, 403 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)(harmless error did not apply where youthful offender was sentenced to a three year minimum term of imprisonment under section 775.087). We remand with directions that the trial court strike those portions of the sentence making…
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Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…l crimes punishable by life imprisonment, and that appellant does not qualify for mandatory youthful offender treatment. This is incorrect. A life felony is different from a felony in the first degree punishable by life imprisonment. Trent v. State, 403 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Therefore we remand this cause for resentencing under Section 958.04, Florida Statutes (1979). REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.…
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Cochran v. State, 410 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…the three-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment specified in section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1979), upon appellant when he was sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act, chapter 948, for the crime of attempted armed robbery. Trent v. State, 403 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). And, for the reasons set out in Patterson, we reject appellant’s contention that his sentence is illegal under Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981). Therefore, we vacate the three-year…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dade Cnty. v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Richardson v. State, 398 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)