MAILMAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., PETITIONER,
v.
E. M. SEGALL, TRUSTEE, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A mortgagee sought certiorari review of a trial court order that substituted the mortgagee's real property lien with a $1.25 million cash deposit in court. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal held that once a stay order is issued, the trial court cannot convert a mortgagee's security interest in real property into cash, and a mortgagee cannot be forced to accept substituted security without agreement.
The trial court's order substituting the mortgagee's real property lien with a cash deposit is void because: (1) once a stay order is issued by an appellate court, the trial court should not convert real property security into cash; and (2) a mortgagee's mortgage lien is a property right that cannot be extinguished and replaced with substituted security except by the parties' agreement, judicial sale, or eminent domain.
[1] A trial court should not proceed with further proceedings after this court has entered a stay order.
[2] A trial court cannot convert a security interest in real property into cash after a stay order has been issued.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon the issuance of a stay order, by this court, the trial court should not have converted the security interest in real property into cash.”
Establishes the core principle that trial courts must respect appellate stay orders by not fundamentally altering the nature of contested security interests.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMailman Development Corp., a mortgagee, was foreclosing a mortgage against E. M. Segall, a mortgagor. Prior to trial, the mortgagee sought certiorari …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Certiorari Review cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner seeks review by certiorari of the trial court’s order entered subsequent to this court’s order staying all further proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner/mortgagee is foreclosing a mortgage against the respondent/mortgagor. Prior to trial, petitioner/mortgagee sought review by certiorari of a discovery order entered by the trial court. This court, upon the filing of the petition, entered a stay order prohibiting further proceedings in the trial court.
Thereafter, the respondent/mortgagor moved in the trial court for the substitution of the security interest in the real property. The trial court granted the motion and released the mortgage on the real property. In lieu of the petitioner’s/mortgagee’s lien on the property, the trial court allowed the respondent/mortgagor to deposit $1.25 million dollars into the registry of the court.
Upon the issuance of a stay order, by this court, the trial court should not have converted the security interest in real property into cash. See Banning v. Brown, 73 Fla. 54, 74 So. 23 (1917); Sunrise Beach, Inc. v. Phillips, 181 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); McLean v. McLean, 340 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Moreover, the petitioner/mortgagee should not be required to accept a substituted security interest since a mortgage lien is a property right which cannot be extinguished and other security substituted except by agreement of the parties, where the property is sold at judicial sale, or taken under the power of eminent domain. Substituted security cannot be forced upon the lien holder in place of his lien. See Seaboard All-Florida Railway v. Leavitt, 141 So. 886 (Fla.1932); White v. White, 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961); 59 CJS Mortgages § 187.
Accordingly, the order authorizing the substitution of security and the release of the mortgage lien on the real property is quashed since it departs from the essential requirements of law. Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541 (Fla.1942) and Griffin v. State, 367 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.
LETTS, C. J., and DOWNEY and MOORE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Fla. Bankers Ass'n v. Fla. Dev. Fin. Corp., 176 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 2015)…contract impairment analysis, it nevertheless stands for the proposition that a mortgagee, who is in essence a party to a security contract, has a property right in preservation of its mortgage interest. See also Mailman Development Corp. v. Segall, 403 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (holding that a “mortgagee should not be required to accept a substituted security interest since a mortgagee lien is a property right.... ”). Moreover, Florida law gives a mortgagee the right to foreclose and refore-close…
-
City OF Panama City v. Head, 797 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…ing that a mortgage is a constitutionally protected property interest. See Zipperer v. City of Ft. Myers, 41 F. 3d 619, 623 (11th Cir.1995), relying upon Sarasota County v. Andrews, 573 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) and Mailman Dev. Corp. v. Segall, 403 So. 2d 1137, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). As the Zipperer court recognized: [*1268] Florida law gives a mortgagee the right to foreclose and reforeclose its hens. Fla. Stat. § 697.01 (1993). Therefore, a mortgage is a cause of action creating a lien on property. S…
-
Beach Cmty. Bank v. Spellman, 206 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…motion with respect to one of the two properties with the condition that the proceeds from the sale be held in escrow or, alternatively, deposited in the court’s registry, until the foreclosure action is concluded. In Mailman Dev. Corp. v. Segall, 403 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the Fourth District granted certiorari under substantially identical circumstances. In that case, the petitioner initiated foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage in real property owned by the respondent. Id. at 1138. The trial co…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Seaboard All-Florida Railway v. Florabel Levitt, 105 Fla. 600 (Fla. 1932)
- Sunrise Beach, Inc. v. Phillips, 181 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Neely Horton Griffin v. State, 367 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Banning v. Brown, 73 Fla. 54 (Fla. 1917)
- Barton T. McLEAN v. McLEAN, 340 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- White v. White, 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)