TERRY HILL, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS MOTHER, GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND KATIE MAE HILL AND KATIE MAE HILL, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., AND MERRITT ALONSO SIMS, APPELLEES
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Terry Hill and his mother Katie Mae Hill appealed a jury verdict in their favor being entered for defendants Allstate Insurance Co. and Merritt Alonso Sims. The court reversed and remanded because the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify about statements Terry Hill made at the accident scene, which were protected by Florida's accident report privilege under Section 316.066.
The trial court erred in allowing the police officer to testify about statements Hill made at the accident scene. The plaintiffs did not waive the statutory accident report privilege by calling the officer as a witness and questioning him only about the accident location, dispatch and arrival times, observations at the scene, and weather conditions. Testimony regarding Hill's statements to the officer falls within the Section 316.066 privilege and should not have been admitted.
[1] Statements made by a party to an investigating police officer at the scene of an accident are privileged and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent civil or criminal…
[2] A party does not waive the statutory privilege regarding accident report statements by calling the investigating officer as a witness and questioning them solely about th…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident.”
This quote establishes the statutory language of Section 316.066, Florida Statutes, which provides the foundation for the accident report privilege at issue in the case.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTerry Hill, a minor, was involved in an accident. At the scene, Hill made statements to an investigating police officer. The defendants sought to intr…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
The plaintiffs, Terry Hill (a minor) and his mother, Katie Mae Hill, appeal from a final judgment on a jury verdict, entered in favor of the defendants, Allstate Insurance Co. and Merritt Alonso Sims.
The appellants contend it was error to allow the investigating police officer to testify concerning what plaintiff, Terry Hill, told him, in that such statements made by Hill at the scene of the accident fall within the “accident report” privilege afforded by Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides that “No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident.” See, generally, Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 177 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).
The appellees contend there was no error in allowing the investigating police officer to testify concerning what plaintiff, Hill, told him, where the statement was made at the scene of the accident during the course of the officer’s investigation, because the privilege under Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1977) was waived.1 Compare: Soler v. Kukula, 297 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) and Leisure Group, Inc. v. Williams, 351 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
The plaintiffs did not waive the statutory privilege simply by calling the police officer as a witness and questioning him solely as to the location of the accident, his dispatch and arrival times, what he observed at the scene, and what the weather conditions were.
Therefore, the final judgment under review is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. The appellees also contend that the privilege was waived by the plaintiffs’ counsel questioning the investigating officer about the location of the vehicles immediately prior to the accident, on redirect examination. We find no merit in this contention; this only occurred after his original objection had been overruled. See; Stripling v. State, 349 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Carbone v. Coblentz, 132 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Lovette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12 So. 2d 168 (1943).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Anne Dinowitz and Pete Dinowitz v. Weinrub, 493 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…was immaterial that the plaintiff was claiming the privilege while the statements were those of the defendant. She had the right to invoke the privilege, by doing or not doing something other than “calling a witness.” Hill v. Allstate Insurance Co., 404 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The statute has a very important purpose; namely, to enable an investigating officer to learn the truth about the occurrence of an accident without the party so revealing it incriminating himself. To whittle away at the statute…
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Thomas v. Gottlieb, 520 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…over objection, elicited the further response that Mr. Thomas did not complain of any injury. This was error. Statements made by Mr. Thomas to the investigating police officer were within the statutory privilege, Hill v. Allstate Insurance Company, 404 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). True, the officer’s testimony related to what Mr. Thomas did not say, rather than to what he did say. The effect, however, is the same. It would be illogical to hold that the statutory privilege would preclude the officer from te…
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Anderson v. Mitchell (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…2. And it became known as the "accident report privilege." See, e.g., Hammond v. Jim Hinton Oil Co., 530 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Johnson v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 542 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Hill v. Allstate Ins., 404 So. 2d 156, 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, the legislature substantially amended the statute in 1989 by deleting (1) the term "privilege," (2) the language making the information confidential, and (3) the language prohibiting its disclosure outside of the…
Authorities Cited
- Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495 (Fla. 1943)
- Stripling v. State, 349 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Wise v. The W. Union Tel. Co., 177 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Soler v. Kukula, 297 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Leisure Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 351 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Carbone v. Coblentz, 132 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)