GARY V. KNAPP, APPELLANT,
v.
NATIONAL CONVENIENCE STORE AND UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, APPELLEES
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An employee who voluntarily left his job six weeks before a scheduled reduction in hours challenged the denial of unemployment benefits. The court reversed, holding that when an employer gives definite notice of termination or significant change, the employee is not ineligible for benefits during the period after the employer's designated termination date, even if he leaves before that date.
An employee who receives definite notice of termination or material reduction of employment and leaves before the effective date has not voluntarily left without good cause attributable to the employer. The employee is ineligible for benefits during the notice period (when he could still work if he chose), but becomes eligible for benefits beginning on the employer's designated termination date, provided he is otherwise eligible.
[1] An employee who leaves employment before a scheduled reduction in hours, but after receiving notice of the reduction, is not considered to have voluntarily left employmen…
[2] An employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits during the notice period between notification of a reduction in hours and the effective date of that reduction, as the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where an employer notifies its employee that his or her employment is being definitely terminated as of a given date, the employee has not "voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer" if he or she chooses not to work during all or part of the period between notification and the date given by the employer as the date of termination”
Establishes the fundamental principle that leaving work after definite notice of termination is not voluntary departure without good cause
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKnapp was employed as a clerk at a convenience store chain from July 30, 1979, through November 16, 1979, working 56 hours per week. On November 10, 1…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from the order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission which affirmed the decision of the appeals referee denying unemployment compensation benefits to claimant, appellant herein.
The claimant was employed from July 30, 1979, through November 16,1979, as a clerk for an employer that operates a chain of convenience food stores. Claimant normally worked 56 hours per week. On November 10, 1979, the store manager told claimant that, effective January 1, 1980, his hours would be reduced from 56 to 16 hours per week. Claimant could have continued working his normal and customary work week until January 1, 1980, but, instead, chose to leave his employment on November 16, 1979, to seek other work.
The appeals referee, in ruling against the claimant, held that, while claimant may have established “good cause attributable to his employer” under Florida Statutes, Section 443.06(1), and entitlement to benefits if he had worked until his hours were cut, his leaving his employment six weeks prior to the date his hours were to be cut was voluntary and not attributable to his employer. In Johnson v. Florida Department of Commerce, 340 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), the court held that the employee was entitled to benefits where she left her job on the same day she was given two-weeks notice, holding (340 So. 2d at 1230):
In reference to the facts of this case we interpret Section 443.06(1), Florida Statutes, to mean that where an employer notifies its employee that his or her employment is'being definitely terminated as of a given date, the employee has not “voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer” if he or she chooses not to work during all or part of the period between notification and the date given by the employer as the date of termination. In such a situation the employer has fired the employee; the employee has not discharged himself, but rather, being faced with the inevitable, has decided to leave before what might be called the notice period is up. In a case of that kind, the period of voluntary unemployment is that portion of the notice period (the notice period being the time, if any, between notice of discharge and actual discharge) during which the employee chooses not to work. The employee is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits during the notice period, for he could continue on the job if he wished. The period of involuntary unemployment begins with the date which the employer designated as the termination date when it gave the employee notice. If the employee is otherwise eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, his leaving work after he was given definite notice will not deprive him of those benefits during the period of involuntary unemployment.
We agree with the foregoing holding of the court in the Johnson case. Accordingly, the order below is reversed and the cause remanded for determination of what benefits, if any, claimant is entitled to beginning in January of 1980.
ERVIN, BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Manning v. State of Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 787 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (finding that a change in an employee’s schedule which caused the employee to work excessive hours was sufficient cause for the employee to terminate employment and still be eligible for benefits); Knapp v. Nat’l Convenience Store, 404 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (indicating that a reduction in hours from 56 to 16 hours per week warranted a finding of good cause for termination attributable to the employer). It does not matter that the employer was entitled to change the employee’s…
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Smalls v. State, 485 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…loyment and the receipt of earnings in the amount of $1,547.00. In attempting to overturn the penalty period, Smalls relies upon Johnston v. Florida Department of Commerce, 340 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) and Knapp v. National Convenience Store, 404 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Although the result we reach may appear harsh when considered against the backdrop of the foregoing decisions, we cannot within the present factual setting follow either authority in the face of section 443.-101, Florida Statute…
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Rivero v. Miami-Dade Cnty. & Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 764 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…l reduction in hours constitutes good cause for an employee to terminate his position and seek unemployment compensation benefits. See Wilson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 604 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Knapp v. Nat’l Convenience Store, 404 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Here, the County stipulated that Rivero never requested benefits under the Family and Medical Leave Act. In fact, Rivero stated on his benefits application that the reason he separated from his employer was because his hours we…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnston v. Fla. Dep't OF Commerce, 340 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)