JANE IRBY CRAIG, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JAMES B. CRAIG, JR., APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1981-10-07
No. 80-1415
ANSTEAD, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Retired, Associate Judge, concur.
404 So. 2d 413 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1981) Caution
Cited by 13 cases

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Synopsis

In a dissolution of marriage action, the trial court failed to rule on the division of settlement proceeds from a prior joint personal injury lawsuit. Both spouses appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the denial of alimony and attorneys' fees but remanded for the trial court to make a ruling on dividing the contested fund, holding that courts cannot abdicate their judicial power to determine property rights in dissolution cases.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's denial of alimony, costs, and attorneys' fees, but reversed the failure to rule on division of the settlement fund. The court held that a trial court must rule on property division in dissolution actions because the final judgment of dissolution settles all property rights and bars further action to determine such rights. The court remanded for the trial court to make a determination regarding division of the fund.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court in a dissolution action must determine all property rights of the parties in its final judgment.

[2] A trial court cannot abdicate its judicial power to determine property rights in a dissolution action.

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Key Quotes

“In a dissolution action, when the question of property rights is raised, the court must determine the issue since its final judgment of dissolution settles all property rights of the parties and bars further action to determine such rights.”

Establishes the mandatory duty of trial courts to rule on property division in dissolution cases

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Facts & Procedural History

Husband and wife brought a joint personal injury lawsuit—the husband for personal injuries and the wife for loss of consortium. The case settled for a…

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Opinion of the Court
BERANEK, Judge.

BERANEK, Judge.

The former husband and wife both appeal a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The marriage was an unfortunate and stormy one. At the time of the final hearing, the major controversy centered on division of the proceeds of a settlement of a prior lawsuit brought by both the husband and wife as plaintiffs. The prior suit was for the husband’s personal injuries and the wife’s loss of consortium. The case was settled for a certain lump sum and the undivided proceeds placed in joint names and held in escrow pending a division by the judge considering the dissolution.

After a final hearing, the court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage and denying all claims for special equities, alimony, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The court refused to rule on division of the settlement proceeds.

On appeal, both parties complain of this lack of a ruling. The wife asserts there was no competent evidence offered on which to base a division, and urges the only possible result was to leave the parties where they stood as joint owners of the fund, each with a 50% interest. She also contends the trial court erred in denying her claims against the husband’s 50% interest by way of lump sum alimony or special equity. The husband asserts that he deserves the entire settlement because he was the injured party and because the wife’s consortium claim was worthless. The husband also contends he was erroneously denied costs and attorney’s fees.

We affirm the trial court’s denial of alimony, costs, and attorney’s fees. However, we see no alternative other than to remand for a ruling on division of the fund, which is actually the only asset in controversy between the parties. In a dissolution action, when the question of property rights is raised, the court must determine the issue since its final judgment of dissolution settles all property rights of the parties and bars further action to determine such rights. Pitman v. Pitman, 338 So. 2d 247 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Henderson v. Henderson, 226 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). The judicial power is not delegable and cannot be abdicated. See Schoenrock v. Ballard, 185 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). This is not a situation where a trial court has reserved jurisdiction to determine property rights after entry of a judgment of dissolution. Here, the court specifically chose not to reach any conclusion as to the division of the fund based on either the evidence or the lack thereof.

We conclude that the court erred in failing to make a ruling regarding division of the fund and remand the matter for further proceedings in this regard.

REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

ANSTEAD, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Retired, Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
    …ll the property she considered that the parties had (presumably as marital property) and present them to the husband. The husband would then choose one of the lists which would constitute his share of the personal marital assets. In Craig v. Craig, 404 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA1981), this court ruled that the trial court must determine the issue of property rights since its final judgment settles all property rights and bars any further action. “The judicial power is not delegable and cannot be abdicated…
  • Lopez v. Lopez, 447 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …solution action, when the question of property rights is raised, the court must determine the issue since its final judgment of dissolution settles all property rights of the parties and bars further action to determine such rights.” Craig v. Craig, 404 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the cause is remanded for a determination of the property rights of the parties. The final judgment is in all other respects affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.…
  • Lieselotte D. Mossel v. Otto K. Mossel, 424 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
    …on the merits we would affirm. The wife here seeks a fresh determination of her right to alimony and a special equity. These issues cannot be raised in a partition suit after the entry of a non-appealed final judgment of dissolution Craig v. Craig, 404 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), Cribb v. Cribb, 261 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Likewise, the counterclaim was similarly correctly dismissed since it seeks a special equity and/or lump sum alimony award. APPEAL DISMISSED. HURLEY and WALDEN, JJ., concur…

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