JO ANN AVERY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES AVERY, DECEASED, AND FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF CYNTHIA ANN AVERY AND CHARLES MARK AVERY, MINORS, SURVIVING CHILDREN OF JAMES AVERY, DECEASED, AND JO ANN AVERY, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
DONALD OWEN AND CITY OF SWEETWATER, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1981-08-11
No. 80-2318
Before BARKDULL and FERGUSON, JJ., and MELVIN, WOODROW M. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
404 So. 2d 754 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1981) Caution
Cited by 5 cases
Topics
Political Subdivisions

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Opinion of the Court
FERGUSON, Judge.

FERGUSON, Judge.

Though we agree that defendants-appellees acted as special agents of Metropolitan Dade County in this case, we find that an ambiguity exists as to whether the parties to the release intended the word “agents” to include appellees. The City of Sweetwater is a political subdivision distinct from Metropolitan Dade County. Ap-pellees became temporarily vested as officers of Dade County when they responded to an emergency call for help from the County. Florida law does not hold that discharge is allowed only to those defendants specifically named, but it does require a clear manifestation of intent to discharge. Hurt v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1980). Appellant released “Metropolitan Dade County, its officers, agents, and employees” and defendant “Edward Hafner”, who as a Metropolitan Dade County Officer is without question an agent of the County. The specific inclusion of agent Hafner and the failure to name Owen and the City of Sweetwater who may be considered “agents” in this case only because they responded to an emergency situation, creates a question of intent precluding entry of summary judgment. Hurt, supra.

Reversed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Sheen v. Archibald Lyon and Rose Lyon, 485 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1986)
    …In the instant case, the release is a typewritten release which only purports to discharge those for whose acts Merrill Lynch could be liable. The form of the release is consistent and the language itself is clear and unambiguous. See Avery v. Owen, 404 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1982) (language of release creates ambiguity where one agent is specifically named and another is not). Further, this Court cannot conclude that the plain meaning of the release is any less clea…
  • Fid. & Cas. Co. OF NEW York v. Cope, 444 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
    …oes not in itself constitute a sufficiently clear manifestation of intent to require the release of the insurer when other parties released are specifically named and there is other evidence contrary to that general language. See also Avery v. Owen, 404 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The record establishes beyond doubt that the parties to the release did not intend to release appellant. Therefore, elements of a reformation action by reason of mutual mistake exist. But under the circumstances of this case an…
  • Campbell v. Harper's Air Inc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)

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