LEROY WALTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Walton was convicted of grand and petty theft based on stolen goods found in a duplex and shed he shared with others. The court reversed the conviction, holding that the State failed to prove personal and exclusive possession necessary to invoke the inference of guilty taking from possession of recently stolen goods.
The conviction must be reversed because the State failed to establish the personal and exclusive possession required to invoke the inference of guilty taking from possession of recently stolen goods. Without this inference, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[1] Possession of recently stolen goods creates an inference of guilty taking only when possession is personal, involves a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by t…
[2] Circumstantial evidence of theft must be of sufficient probative force to support a legal inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and must be inconsistent with a rea…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Knowledge and intent are essential elements of the offense charged.”
Establishes that the State must prove these elements rather than rely solely on the inference from possession of stolen goods.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Barbour, following an anonymous tip, conducted surveillance of a duplex where Walton resided. While waiting for backup, Barbour observed a she…
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SHAW, Judge.
The appellant challenges his conviction for grand and petty theft on the grounds that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and in refusing to dismiss the information against him.
Officer Barbour, on May 21, 1979, as a follow-up to an anonymous tip, set up surveillance of a duplex in which the appellant resided. While waiting for a back-up unit to arrive, the officer observed the appellant drive away. Barbour approached the duplex and was able to look through the door and observe a female occupant and a three-piece shelving unit fitting the description of a unit recently stolen from Dean Construction Company. The appellant was arrested and placed in the Alachua County Adult Detention Center.
On May 31, 1979, while appellant was still in the Center, Officer Barbour returned to the premises with a search warrant. Entry was gained to the duplex by use of a key supplied by either Mr. Egon Klementi, the owner of the apartment complex, or a third party. Mr. Klem-enti took the officers to the rear of the duplex and unlocked a shed. The appellant was charged and convicted for theft of items found in the duplex and shed.
The conviction must be reversed. Knowledge and intent are essential elements of the offense charged. The State has attempted to obviate its burden of proof by its reliance upon the rule that possession of recently stolen goods carries with it the inference that the possessor is the guilty taker. State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1968). The position taken by the State ignores the restrictive nature of the rule. The inference of guilty taking that accompanies the possession of recently stolen goods is limited by the further requirement that possession be personal, that it involve a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, and that possession must be exclusive. Griffin v. State, 370 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
The State agrees that the duplex in which the stolen items were found was leased to the appellant and two other named occupants, Sally Walton and Patti Elizabeth King. The shed was also shared jointly by the appellant and his landlord, Mr. Egon Klementi.
The evidence does not show personal or exclusive possession in the appellant.
Therefore, the inference of guilty taking does not accompany the State’s case in this instance. Stripped of this inference, the State’s proof was confined to evidence that stolen goods were found in premises in which the appellant enjoyed a joint possessory right, the value of the property and ownership in someone other than the appellant. With the removal of the inference of guilty taking the State’s case against the appellant is purely circumstantial. While the crime of theft may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be of sufficient probative force to support a legal inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The proof must not only be consistent with guilt, but also incon sistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The State’s proof in this instance does not rise to that level. The judgment appealed is reversed.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
WILLIAM C. OWEN, Jr., (Ret.), Associate Judge, dissenting without opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Scobee v. State, 488 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…nowledge that the property is stolen. There are two similar, yet separate and distinct, inferences that can be made from proof of possession of recently stolen property: (1) an inference that the possessor stole the property, as in Walton v. State, 404 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Griffin v. State, 370 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and (2) an inference that the possessor knew or should have known the property was stolen. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, supra. The latter was the charge given he…
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Garcia v. State, 899 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…from a mere involuntary or superficial possession. Reynolds v. State, 92 Fla. 1038, 111 So. 285 (1927). It must be personal; that is, involve a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, and it must be exclusive. Walton v. State, 404 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 412 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1982). 429 So. 2d at 843. Here, the only evidence of appellant’s possession of the victim’s recently stolen property was his presence, along with three other people, in the van c…1 / 2
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Boone v. State, 711 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…only where the possession is personal, where it involves a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, and where the possession is exclusive. F.W.B; King v. State, 431 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Chamberland; Walton v. State, 404 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1982); Griffin v. State, 370 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Here, it is not clear which stolen property was the basis for this instruction. Usually, this instruction is used when the stolen p…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968)
- Griffin v. State, 370 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)