COOKIE ALDERMAN GARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES HENRY CRUCE, JR. AND MARGARET JUNE DIEHL, APPELLEES
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Cookie Alderman Garris appealed a summary judgment dismissing her declaratory decree action claiming to be the illegitimate child of James H. Cruce and asserting an interest in his homestead property. The court affirmed, holding that her paternity claim was barred by the statute of limitations because her substantive rights as a potential heir vested at Cruce's death in 1963, and the limitations period had run before she filed suit in 1980, even accounting for her infancy.
The court held that appellant's substantive rights as a potential heir vested at the time of James H. Cruce's death in 1963, and the statute of limitations properly runs on such claims. Although the statute could not run during appellant's infancy, it began running when she reached majority on September 15, 1972, and had expired by the time she filed suit on April 17, 1980. The statute of limitations provision does not violate equal protection guarantees.
[1] A statute of limitations for asserting heirship claims begins to run when the decedent's estate vests, not upon the termination of a life estate, if the heir's status is…
[2] The statute of limitations for initiating a paternity action does not run against a minor during their infancy.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that appellant's substantive rights, if any, as an heir of James H. Cruce vested at the time of his death in 1963.”
Establishes that the key issue is when appellant's rights vested for statute of limitations purposes—at the decedent's death, not at later events.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames H. Cruce died intestate on March 28, 1963, owning homestead property in Madison County, Florida. He was survived by his wife Lizzie (who retaine…
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MASON, ERNEST E. (Retired), Associate Judge.
Appellant appeals from a final summary judgment holding that her complaint for declaratory decree is barred by the various statutes of limitations contained in Chapter 95, Florida Statutes. We affirm.
James H. Cruce died intestate on March 28, 1963. At the time of his death he owned certain real property in Madison County, Florida, which constituted his homestead under the laws of the State of Florida for the purpose of descent and distribution. At the time of his death, he was married to and survived by Lizzie A. Cruce, who retained a life estate in the homestead property. Born of their marriage were two children, James H. Cruce, Jr. and Margaret June Diehl.
Lizzie Cruce died on November 15, 1979. On April 17, 1980, appellant Cookie Aider-man Garris, filed a complaint for declaratory decree seeking a determination that she was the illegitimate child of James H. Cruce and Mary Bell Alderman. Thus, she claimed an interest as a lineal descendant of James H. Cruce pursuant to Section 732.-401, Florida Statutes, to one-third of the homestead property. The trial judge, however, found that appellant’s cause of action if any, accrued on March 28, 1963, and was barred by the statutory limitations of Chapter 95, Florida Statutes. Appellant urges that this determination was incorrect and that the cause should proceed to a trial on the merits.
Appellant correctly notes that, as a general rule, the statute of limitations will not run against a remainderman prior to the termination of a life tenancy where the life tenant’s conduct is consistent with his or her duty toward the remainderman. Wagner v. Moseley, 104 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla.2d DCA 1958). Upon close examination, this rule has no application to this case. Our concern is whether appellant has timely asserted her claim for paternity. Her rights and benefits as an heir, and thus as a re-mainderman, flow only upon a determination that she is a natural child of the deceased. However, if the filial relationship is not so properly determined, it follows that she would have no status as an heir, and thus no remainder interest in the intestate’s estate.
We hold that appellant’s substantive rights, if any, as an heir of James H. Cruce vested at the time of his death in 1963. In Re Estate of Burris, 361 So. 2d 152, 156, n.5 (Fla.1973). However, infants not being sui juris, the statute of limitations for initiating this paternity action, Section 95.11(3)(b), Florida Statutes, could not run against appellant during her infancy. See Commercial Building Company v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143, 112 So. 378 (1927). Nevertheless, since appellant reached her majority on September 15, 1972, the limitation period prescribed by Section 95.11(3)(b) had run by the time she filed her suit on April 17,1980.
Appellant also urges that Section 95.-ll(3)(b) is unconstitutional, citing State, Dept. of Health, etc. v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.1979). However, the language of West belies such an argument:
The only proper application of the statute of limitations [Section 95.11(3)(b)] to child support claims would be to those claims that have accrued in the past but which are not adjudicated. The state could properly say that a claim for child support not made within a certain time after it accrued is barred. However, since the duty of support continues throughout the minority of the child, new causes of action are being created each day that the natural father does not provide support. This duty of future support cannot be barred for illegitimate children if it is allowed for legitimate children, (emphasis supplied)
West, at 1228.
Similarly, since appellant’s rights, if any, as an heir vested at the time of James H. Cruce’s death in 1963, the statute of limitations could properly run on her claim without offending any equal protection guarantees.
AFFIRMED.
McCORD and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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In re Est. OF Charles W. Smith v. Scruggs, 685 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1996)…clear that we did not declare the statute facially unconstitutional but rather as applied to claims for child support. Subsequent decisions have recognized that West declared section 95.11(3)(b) unconstitutional only as applied. In Garris v. Cruce, 404 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), review denied, 413 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1982), a paternity suit was filed in 1980 seeking a determination that Garris was the child of Cruce and therefore entitled to inherit from Cruce. The court held that Garris’s claim was barred…
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Rogers v. L.K. Runnels, 448 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…paternity. For the same reasons expressed in Kendrick, we hold that the child, upon reaching majority, has the right to bring an action for declaratory judgment to determine paternity. This right was at least tacitly recognized in Garris v. Cruce, 404 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), although the court there held that the statute of limitations barred the action because the plaintiff waited longer than four years after attaining majority to bring the action. We need not decide how the statute of limitations…
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In re Est. OF Charles W. Smith v. Wilson, 640 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…ld not be barred. Thus unaccrued future support, available to legitimate offspring, could not be denied those bom out of wedlock. Ms. Scruggs’ right to inherit did not vest until Smith died in 1992. § 732.-101(2), Fla.Stat. (1991); Garris v. Cruce, 404 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1982). It is well established that a statute of limitations will not begin to run until the occurrence of the last event which gives rise to the cause of action. § 95.031, Fla.Stat. (1991); Kelle…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. West, 378 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 1979)
- Commercial Bldg. Co. v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143 (Fla. 1927)
- Rosella Wagner v. Moseley, 104 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- In re the Est. of Daymon C. Burris, 361 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1978)