DOUGLAS MCARTHUR ROWE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Douglas McArthur Rowe was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed, arguing the trial court erred by denying his motion for severance from his co-defendant. The appellate court agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by forcing Rowe to stand trial before two accusers—the state and his co-defendant—when the defenses were antagonistic.
The trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for severance. When a co-defendant's defense is antagonistic and involves accusing the defendant of sole responsibility for the crime, forcing them to stand trial together violates principles of fairness and effectively compels the defendant to stand trial before two accusers—the state and the co-defendant.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion for severance when the defenses of co-defendants are antagonistic and one co-defendant accuses the other of sole r…
[2] When a co-defendant accuses another co-defendant of sole responsibility for a crime and introduces evidence to support that accusation, the trial court improperly forces…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By denying the motion, the trial court forced [the appellant] to stand trial before two accusers: the State and his codefendant.”
Establishes the core principle that severance must be granted when a co-defendant's defense is antagonistic and involves accusing the defendant of sole responsibility for the crime.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn late 1979, Rowe and a co-defendant were indicted for the murder of Elijah Rowe. Before trial, Rowe moved for severance, arguing that his co-defenda…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
On this appeal from a conviction for first degree murder, the appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for severance. We agree and reverse.
In late 1979, a grand jury indicted the appellant and one other person, charging them with the murder of Elijah Rowe. The appellant and his co-defendant were scheduled to be tried together. Well before trial, the appellant filed a motion for severance, alleging that “such severance [was] necessary to promote a fair determination of [his] guilt or innocence.” At a hearing pertaining to this motion, his defense counsel argued that the defenses for the appellant and his co-defendant were antagonistic, and that unless the motion for severance was granted, “the defendants are going to be in the posture of prosecuting each other with the State standing by.”
The trial court denied the motion for severance, and the appellant and his co-defendant were tried together. At trial, each denied responsibility for the murder, and both introduced evidence to support their respective theories of innocence. In this regard, defense counsel for the appellant’s co-defendant accused the appellant of being solely responsible for causing the death of the murder victim. Evidence was introduced by the co-defendant in an attempt to support this theory.
“Granting or denying a motion for severance is normally a discretionary matter for the trial court.” Crum v. State, 398 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla.1981). In this case, we have determined, based upon Crum, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for severance.
In Crum, the appellant and his co-defendant were indicted and tried together for first degree murder. The appellant moved for severance, alleging that his defense and that of his co-defendant were so antagonistic as to warrant a severance. The appellant represented that he had learned that his codefendant “would accuse him of singularly committing the murder for which the two of them were charged.” 398 So. 2d at 811. The trial court denied the motion for severance, and the supreme court reversed, stating that “[b]y denying the motion, the trial court forced [the appellant] to stand trial before two accusers: the State and his codefendant.” 398 So. 2d at 811-12. Here, just as in Crum, the appellant was accused by his co-defendant of being solely responsible for the murder. The trial court was aware that this accusation would be made at trial, and just as in Crum, the co-defendant in the present case not only accused the appellant of the murder, “but also, during the trial, introduced evidence to prove [t]his accusation.” 398 So. 2d at 812. Given these factors, the court improperly forced the appellant “to stand trial before two accusers: the State and his codefend-ant.” Id. at 811-812.
The appellant’s conviction is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new trial. In view of this holding, we do not address the other issues raised by the appellant.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and JOA-NOS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2003)…after the trial had begun, prejudiced the second codefendant’s trial preparation and justified the trial judge’s order for separate trials. Similar circumstances did not occur in Lugo’s case, nor did circumstances similar to those in Rowe v. State, 404 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), occur here. Lugo's reliance on Rowe is also unavailing. . Testimony from Lugo’s federal probation officer established the terms of Lugo's probation. Testimony from a bank official established that Lugo had drawn a check to pay…
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Jones v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2001)…error regarding this issue.” Jones I, 580 So. 2d at 146. Jones’s direct appeal argument on this point was at its core an argument for severance. On direct appeal, appellate counsel argued Crum v. State, 398 So. 2d 810 (Fla.1981), and Rowe v. State, 404 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in support of appellate counsel’s point on appeal. These cases concern severance. See Crum, 398 So. 2d at 811-12; Rowe, 404 So. 2d at 1176-77. In this habeas petition, Jones argues the same Crum and Rowe eases to support collate…
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Dean v. State, 430 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…s pointed right at Mr. Dean. [*498] In considering the question whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for severance because of conflicting defenses, that the state is not a wrong-doer is totally irrelevant. In Rowe v. State, 404 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) it was held that where each defendant accused his co-defendant of being solely responsible for the alleged crime and introduced evidence to prove the accusations, the trial judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion for sever…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crum v. State, 398 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1981)