EUGENE PEGUES, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Watts v. The Honorable Morison Buck, 454 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
  …he current statute contains no such limitation. As to the second point, we find no error in the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel. See In the Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 89 (Fla.1980); McKay v. Jenkins, 405 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Accordingly, the petition for writ of cer-tiorari is DENIED. HOBSON, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN and DANAHY, JJ., concur. . Section 944.292, Florida Statutes (1983), provides: Suspension of civil rights. — Upon conviction of a…
• Klaver v. Rosebury Albert Mander, III, 468 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
  …county court of this civil action by an incarcerated plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he was entitled to be present at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, citing Baker v. Baker, 403 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) and McKay v. Jenkins, 405 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We disagree. Although Baker and McKay express concern over the opportunity of an incarcerated defendant to appear in person or through counsel, neither involves a situation, as here, where the incarcerated person is plaintiff. I…
• In re Forfeiture OF the Following Described Prop. $2 v. State, 559 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
  …property. Moreover, since he is indigent, appellant cannot appear for trial via counsel. We hold that, under these circumstances, the entry of an order of default in favor of the plaintiff/state is violative of due process. Compare McKay v. Jenkins, 405 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Klaver v. Mander, 468 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). Finally, we would note that, because of the absence from the record on appeal of some of the early pleadings, it is not entirely clear as to whether these consolidated cases…

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Authorities Cited

• Counts v. State, 376 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
• Angelean P. Milton v. State, 390 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)