FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY GROUP, CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANIES, AND UNDERWRITERS ADJUSTING COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
ARMAND FAIRHURST, APPELLEE
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Foster Wheeler Energy Group and its insurers appealed a workers' compensation decision awarding medical benefits to employee Armand Fairhurst for ear problems allegedly related to an industrial accident. The court affirmed, holding that interest payments constitute compensation under the statute of limitations, and that the employer's December 1979 letter reasonably indicated willingness to accept the claim if medical causation was established.
The court held that interest on compensation payable under a worker's compensation order constitutes compensation within the statute of limitations. The employer's December 1979 letter reasonably indicated it would accept the claim upon medical proof of causation, and the employer cannot interpose the statute of limitations defense after misleading the claimant. The deputy commissioner properly found the medical treatment was emergency in nature, medical evidence established causation, and the January 15, 1980 letter requesting a hearing satisfied the 'claim' requirement for attorney's fees.
[1] Payment of interest on worker's compensation benefits constitutes "compensation" for purposes of the statute of limitations.
[2] An employer/carrier may be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense if it misleads a claimant into believing their claim will be accepted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the carrier's payment on January 4, 1978 of interest on compensation payable under a worker's compensation order should be deemed "compensation" within the meaning of that term as used in the two year statute of limitations provision”
Establishes that interest payments constitute compensation under the statute of limitations, following Lockett v. Smith
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 4, 1978, the carrier paid interest on compensation owed to claimant Fairhurst under a worker's compensation order. On December 14, 1979, th…
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PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration, we have concluded that the carrier’s payment on January 4, 1978 of interest on compensation payable under a worker’s compensation order should be deemed “compensation” within the meaning of that term as used in the two year statute of limitations provision of Section 440.19(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979).
In so deciding we follow the rationale of Lockett v. Smith, 72 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1954), and find that interest owed by the employer/carrier on sums due to the claimant for disability compensation serves to compensate the claimant, rather than to penalize the E/C. Cf. Ferlita v. Florida Art Stucco Corporation, 74 So. 2d 893 (Fla.1954).
The December 14, 1979 letter from the E/C’s attorney to claimant’s attorney indicates that the only possible obstacle to the E/C’s acceptance of liability was the receipt of medical confirmation of a causal relationship between the claimant’s current ear problems and his industrial accident. We think this interpretation is one that reasonably could be made, notwithstanding the letter’s further qualification “if the applicable Statute of Limitations has not expired,” since the claimant’s ear problems and Dr. Rubin’s treatment occurred well within the two-year period, and the statute had not run when the letter was written. The E/C cannot, intentionally or otherwise, mislead a claimant into believing that his injury would be considered compensable if adequately shown by adequate medical proof to be causally related to his industrial accident, and then interpose the statute of limitations as a defense after the time for filing a formal claim has expired. Pate v. Bay County School Board, IRC Order 2-3076 (19 ); Shockley Plumbing Inc. v. Yarbrough, IRC Order 2 — 2450 (19 ); Catalano v. Hillsborough County Board of Public Instruction, 249 So. 2d 24 (Fla.2nd DCA 1971).
The December 28, 1979 letter from claimant’s attorney to the E/C’s attorney, enclosing a December 17, 1979 letter from Dr. Rubin relating the claimant’s current ear problems to his accident, adequately demonstrates the claimant’s reliance upon the indications from the E/C’s attorney’s letter of December 14, 1979 that the claim for medical benefits would be accepted. In view of the self-executing nature of the worker’s compensation law, we conclude that the deputy commissioner’s refusal to apply the statute of limitations to bar the medical claim in this instance was justified. See Southern Culvert Pipe Co. v. Oswalt, 382 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
We also affirm the deputy commissioner’s finding that Dr. Rubin’s treatment of the claimant was of an emergency nature, rendering it impracticable for the claimant to seek prior authorization, and that the medical evidence was sufficient to establish a causal relation between the condition for which the claimant was treated and his prior industrial accident. We further find without merit the contention by the E/C that since no formal claim was filed, the award of attorney’s fees was error. The claimant’s January 15,1980 letter requesting a hearing on his request for medical benefits satisfies the requirement of a “claim” for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees. See Car Stop Unlimited, et al. v. Salmon, 404 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Nw. Orient Airlines & Underwriters Adjusting Co. v. Gonzalez, 500 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…s no attempt to obtain prior authorization by adducing such evidence before a D/C, nor that the surgery was done on an emergency basis, rendering it impracticable for Gonzalez to seek that authorization. See Foster Wheeler Energy Group v. Fairhurst, 405 So. 2d 438, 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Because the record reflects that Dr. Levitt’s bill was for treatment, i.e. surgery, the referral by an authorized physician does not operate to make the E/C responsible therefor and the award of payment of that bill must be…
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McKINNEY v. Edward J. Gerrits, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…linquency, and the court decided that claimant should not be impeded in his attempt to obtain such an award by the thought of counsel fees. See also Poyntz v. William Adeimy, Inc., 190 So. 2d 745 (Fla.1966); Foster Wheeler Energy Group v. Fairhurst, 405 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In the instant case, it would appear that the 75%/100% dichotomy in the 1978 attorney’s fee statute was intended to compensate claimants for attorney’s fee payments in situations where the employer/carrier was negligent, arbitr…
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Chemco Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 475 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…rrier can be estopped to assert the defense of the statute of limitations, (see Howanitz v. Biscayne Electric, Inc. 139 So. 2d 678 (Fla.1962); Engle v. [*726] Deerborne School, 226 So. 2d 681 (Fla.1969); and Foster Wheeler Energy Group v. Fairhurst, 405 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)), these cases are distinguishable on the facts. Because the record does not support the imposition of estoppel and the nature of estoppel necessarily limits the evidence and questions presented at hearings, this case is reversed…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lockett v. Smith, 72 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1954)
- CAR Stop Unlimited & R. P. Hewitt & Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. Salmon, 404 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Catalano v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. OF Pub. Instruction, 249 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1971)
- Ferlita v. Fla. ART Stucco Corp., 74 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1954)
- Driggers v. State, 382 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- S. Culvert Pipe Co. v. Oswalt, 382 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)