PATRICIA ANN COLE, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HER PARENT, NATURAL GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND, PATRICIA VIOLA LEACH AND PATRICIA VIOLA LEACH, IN HER OWN RIGHT, APPELLANTS,
v.
MORLEY ALLEN LEACH AND SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dog bite case, the trial court dismissed the complaint because it failed to allege that the defendant owned the dog. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that where a plaintiff sues on a common law negligence theory rather than statutory dog owner liability, ownership of the dog need not be alleged in the complaint.
A complaint based on common law negligence rather than statutory dog owner liability does not need to allege ownership of the dog. The complaint sufficiently alleged the defendant's negligent conduct and the minor plaintiff's injury as a proximate result, as the dog attack was a reasonably foreseeable intervening cause of the defendant's negligent conduct.
[1] A complaint alleging common law negligence for injuries caused by a dog bite need not allege the defendant's ownership of the dog.
[2] A defendant whose negligence causes injury to another is liable for all natural and proximate consequences of that injury, including those caused by an intervening cause…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One whose negligence causes injury to another is liable for all of the consequences that naturally and proximately flow from such injury, Cone v. Intercounty Telephone and Telegraph Company, 40 So. 2d 148 (Fla.1940), including injury from an intervening cause when such intervening cause is itself a reasonably forseeable consequence of the tortfeasor's conduct”
Establishes the legal principle that a negligent defendant is liable for foreseeable intervening causes, which is the basis for the court's holding.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatricia Ann Cole, a minor, and her mother were social guests in the home of defendant Morley Allen Leach. While present in the defendant's home, the …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Derivative Claims cases and more on FLexlaw
OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired) Associate Judge.
This dog bite case met its demise in the initial pleading stage. The complaint did not allege that the defendant owned the dog. Defendant’s motion to dismiss not only alerted the court to the absence of any allegation concerning ownership of the dog, but also gratuitously alleged, apparently as the coup de grace, that the dog was, in fact, owned by the plaintiffs. Being satisfied that the defendant was not the owner of the dog, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on that ground. We reverse.
The complaint was in three counts. Count I alleged, in substance, that while the minor plaintiff, Patricia Ann Cole, and her mother were social guests in the home of the defendant, the latter carelessly and negligently caused an assault and battery upon the person of the minor plaintiff in the presence of a dangerous dog when the defendant either knew or should have known that violent behavior on defendant’s part in the presence of the dog would cause the dog to attack and injure persons in its immediate vicinity, and that as a consequence of defendant’s conduct in causing the assault and battery upon the person of the minor plaintiff, the dog did enter into the fray and bite the minor plaintiff. Count III was the derivative claim of the minor plaintiff’s mother. Had plaintiffs’ cause of action against the defendant been founded upon the statutory liability of a dog owner under Chapter 767, Florida Statutes, the complaint surely would have to allege defendant’s ownership of the dog in order to successfully withstand a motion to dismiss. But here, plaintiffs travel on a legal theory entirely unrelated to ownership of the dog, namely, common law negligence of the defendant. Although the complaint might have been more artfully drafted, we hold that it sufficiently alleges1 defendant’s negligent conduct and the minor plaintiff’s injury proximately resulting. One whose negligence causes injury to another is liable for all of the consequences that naturally and proximately flow from such injury, Cone v. Intercounty Telephone and Telegraph Company, 40 So. 2d 148 (Fla.1940), including injury from an intervening cause when such intervening cause is itself a reasonably forseeable consequence of the tortfeasor’s conduct, Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla.1980), the question of whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable being one for the trier of fact. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., supra.
Count II did not allege a valid cause of action. The order dismissing the complaint with prejudice is reversed as to Counts I and III, and this cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Upon the issuance of mandate in this cause, the court is authorized, in the exercise of its discretion and in the interest of justice, to permit amendment to the complaint.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BERANEK, J., and GREEN, OLIVER L., Associate Judge, concur. . We are concerned only with the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint, not with the truth of the allegations or with any defenses that might be affirmatively pleaded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Loranger v. State, 448 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…in support thereof, and at the hearing on the motion, DOT argued only that its alleged negligence in improperly maintaining the fence was too remote as a matter of law to constitute a proximate causal factor of Timothy’s injuries. In Cole v. Leach, 405 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), this court stated: One whose negligence causes injury to another is liable for all of the consequences that naturally and proximately flow from such injury, Cone v. Inter-county Telephone and Telegraph Company, 40 So. 2d 1…
-
Mark J. Letzter, M.D. v. Cephas, 792 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1977). Under traditional negligence principles, a tortfeasor is responsible for all reasonably foreseeable consequences of his or her actions. See, e.g., Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330, 331 (1925); Cole v. Leach, 405 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). An independent, unforeseeable intervening force, however, may serve to break the causal link and extinguish liability. See Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla.1980); Bosket v. Broward County Hous.…
-
Nason v. Darrel Shafranski, 33 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…81, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001): Under traditional negligence principles, a tortfeasor is responsible for all reasonably foreseeable consequences of his or her actions. See, e.g., Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330, 331 (1925); Cole v. Leach, 405 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). An independent, unforeseeable intervening force, however, may serve to break the causal link and extinguish liability. See Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla.1980); Bosket v. Broward County Hous.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gibson v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)
- Cone v. Inter Cnty. Tel. Tel. Co., 40 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1949)