ELMER VAN ARSDALL, ET AL.,
v.
CITY OF WINTER HAVEN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, ET AL.
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The court held that the chancellor correctly sustained the motion to dismiss because the suit was not a class action.
Plaintiffs' property was outside the municipality's corporate limits and had been excluded by a quo warranto judgment. The defendant City had placed s…
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The plaintiffs-appellants brought their bill and have attempted to lay a predicate for its being treated and considered as a class suit. The chancellor sustained defendant’s motion to dismiss and thereupon plaintiffs prosecuted the appeal.
The only factual matters presented by the bill are that plaintiffs’ property was without the corporate limits except for the provisions of Chapter 11301, Laws of Florida, 1925, and that plaintiffs’ land lies within that area which was in 1934 by quo warranto adjudged to be excluded from the municipality, as reported in State ex rel Landis vs. City of Winter Haven, 114 Fla. 199, 154 So. 700.
Plaintiffs further alleged that after the passage of Chapter 11301, supra, and before the exclusion by the adjudication in the quo warranto action, viz in 1925, the defendant City placed special improvement liens against the property of plaintiff. Without the allegation of any additional facts going to any equity, the plaintiffs charge that the liens are invalid.
The chancellor was correct in holding that plaintiffs’ suit was not a class suit. See City of Lakeland v. Chase National Company, 159 Fla. 783, 32 So. 2nd 833. The chancellor properly sustained the motion to dismiss.
The decree appealed is affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J., ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
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Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953)…h power respecting the regulation and control of alcoholic beverages as is given it by the Legislature. See Singer v. Scarborough, 155 Fla. 357, 20 So. 2d 126; City of Miami v. Kichinko, 156 Fla. 128, 22 So. 2d 627; Fleeman v. Vocelle, 160 Fla. 898, 37 So. 2d 164.” [*676] In other words, the city had the right by zoning to establish zones where alcoholic beverages could, or could not, be sold, but had no express or implied authority to prescribe or fix the manner, or method, of sale different from that fixed…
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City OF Wilton Manors v. Starling, 121 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)…power respecting the regulation and control of .alcoholic beverages as is given it by the Legislature. See Singer v. Scarborough, 155 Fla. 357, 20 So. 2d 126; City of Miami v. Kichinko, 156 Fla. 128, 22 So. 2d 627; Fleeman v. Vocelle, 160 Fla. 898, 37 So. 2d 164.” The Court then concluded that since the City of Miami Beach had made no showing fihat it was authorized to restrict vendors in ■the class of Goldworm to sales from “service bars” only, the provisions of the Miami Beach ordinance attempting to do…
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Authorities Cited
- Foster v. Lavinah H. Jones, 114 Fla. 199 (Fla. 1934)
- City OF Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co. a Corp., 159 Fla. 783 (Fla. 1947)