STEPHEN W. TITTLE, MARTY EUGENE WHITE, AND RICKY VICKERS, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1981-10-13
Nos. WW-130, WW-352 and XX-164
BOOTH, SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
405 So. 2d 1007 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that armed robbery is not a life felony, thus defendants previously found guilty of it may be classified as youthful offenders, but a defendant with a prior felony conviction is ineligible.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellants pleaded guilty to armed robbery and/or aggravated battery and were denied youthful offender status. They appealed the sentences, arguing th…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Tittle, White and Vickers appeal the sentences entered against them following their pleas of guilty to the charge of armed robbery. Appellant Tittle also appeals the sentence entered against him following his plea of guilty to the additional charge of aggravated battery. Each appellant contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to sentence him as a youthful offender under Section 958.04, Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm as to appellant Tittle and reverse as to appellants White and Vickers.

Section 958.04(l)(c) provides in part that “no person who has been found guilty of a capital or life felony may be classified [as] a youthful offender . . . . ” The trial judge concluded that this statute was applicable because armed robbery with a firearm was a life felony. However, armed robbery is not a “life felony” nor can it be enhanced to such by operation of 775.087(l)(a), Florida Statutes. Richardson v. State, 398 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Accordingly, the trial judge erred in refusing to treat appellants White and Vickers as youthful offenders.

Our reversal does not apply to appellant Tittle. A defendant does not qualify for youthful offender treatment under the mandatory provisions of that act if he had been “previously found guilty of a felony.” 958.04(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). The record reflects that Tittle was simultaneously adjudicated guilty of armed robbery and aggravated battery and was thereafter sentenced. Under these circumstances, appellant Tittle was properly excluded from mandatory classification as a youthful offender. Barnhill v. State, 393 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Goodson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), approved, 403 So. 2d 1337 (Fla.1981).

Accordingly, we affirm with respect to appellant Tittle and reverse and remand for the trial court to resentence appellants White and Vickers in a manner consistent with this opinion.

BOOTH, SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Brown v. State, 458 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
    …(Fla. 5th DCA 1983). We have held, however, that armed robbery is already an enhanced charge under the robbery statute. Hill v. State, 434 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); see also Garvin v. State, 413 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Tittle v. State, 405 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Lee v. State, 400 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Richardson v. State, 398 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We think this applies whether the proof at trial establishes that the defendant carried or used a firearm. See Whitehea…
  • Verdell Hill, Jr. v. State, 434 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
    …wo other appellate court opinions have held that robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon is a first degree felony and not a life felony and that the Youthful Offender Act applies to under-age persons convicted of those crimes. Tittle v. State, 405 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Richardson v. State, 398 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The state also urges that we should dismiss this ease because of various procedural mistakes made by the petitioner. We could do that by a mere unexplained dismissal, bu…

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