CHARLES MAGGIO, APPELLANT,
v.
JUDITH A. MAGGIO, APPELLEE
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Charles Maggio appealed a dissolution judgment that awarded his former wife special equity interests in property no longer owned by either party. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court improperly awarded special equities without specifying the res (specific property or fund) in which they vested.
The court held that special equities cannot be awarded unless the judgment specifies the particular res or specific fund in which they vest. The judgment's reference to a lien "in said amount" against the Brown Derby was insufficient and too ambiguous to be enforceable. Therefore, the awards of $6,000 and $7,000 in special equity were reversed and the case was remanded for reconsideration.
[1] A trial court may award a spouse special equity based on contributions of funds, property, or services made over and above normal marital duties.
[2] A special equity award must specify the res, or specific fund, in which the equity vests.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Special equity is a vested interest which a spouse acquires because of contribution of funds, property or services made over and above the performance of normal marital duties.”
Establishes the legal definition of special equity that the court applies to evaluate the trial court's award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePrior to marriage, Mrs. Maggio owned a Florida home which she sold. The $12,000 in proceeds were used to purchase a car for the husband and help pay o…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Charles Maggio appeals from the final judgment of dissolution which awarded his former wife special equity in property no longer owned by either of the parties.
Prior to this marriage, Mrs. Maggio owned a home in Florida which she subsequently sold; the proceeds were used both to purchase a car for the husband and to help pay off a loan obtained by the husband to apply to the purchase of a New Jersey home. At the dissolution hearing, the trial judge determined that Mrs. Maggio was entitled to special equity in the following:
4. The Wife shall be awarded the following special equities:
A. $6,000.00 representing one-half of her cash contribution ($12,000.00) to the marriage, used to purchase the Husband’s car and pay the Husband’s accountant.
D. $7,000.00 representing one-half of the excess proceeds of the sale ($14,-000.00) of the jointly held New Jersey marital domicile which the Husband placed in a separate account and was used in the purchase of the Brown Derby [a restaurant].
Special equity is a vested interest which a spouse acquires because of contri bution of funds, property or services made over and above the performance of normal marital duties. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla.1980). See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). The trial court may award a special equity when those ownership rights are reasonably ascertainable. Lawless v. Lawless, 362 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). However, it is error for the trial judge to award a special equity without specifying the res in which it vests. Veiner v. Veiner, 364 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
The $6,000 and $7,000 special equities awarded here cannot be upheld because the final judgment does not award those special equities in a specified res, or a specific fund. Though the final judgment states that “the Wife shall be entitled to a lien in said amount to secure payment against the Brown Derby,” that is not sufficient to comply with the finding of a special equity in a particular res. In addition, the lien language of the judgment is too ambiguous to be enforceable against the husband. The final judgment finds the wife entitled to a special equity in four separate and distinct amounts without specifying a total and yet the lien language awards a lien “in said amount.”
Inasmuch as we find the special equities of $6,000 and $7,000 improper, we reverse the final judgment and remand to the trial court. Because our finding of error in the two specified special equities may be disruptive to the trial court’s plan of doing equity between the parties, upon remand, the trial judge may rehear and reconsider the equities and the parties’ needs and abilities to pay to insure a proper judgment is entered. In doing so, upon a proper showing and finding, a distribution of these same sums could be effected through the use of lump sum alimony.
REVERSED and REMANDED for treatment consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and OTT, J., concur.
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Iribar v. Iribar, 510 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…p sum alimony because (a) the parties owned no automobile to be distributed to the wife, and (b) the trial court otherwise equitably distributed the assets of the marriage. See Poitier v. Poitier, 458 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Maggio v. Maggio, 405 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Feldman v. Feld-man, 390 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Second, we see no merit in the wife’s attack on the rehabilitative alimony award. The award was strictly a bridge-the-gap type of award as the wife is presentl…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Kattie Sue Lawless v. Lawless, 362 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Veiner v. Veiner, 364 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)