ESSIE WOODS, APPELLANT,
v.
GREATER NAPLES CARE CENTER AND R. P. HEWITT & ASSOCIATES, APPELLEES
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This workers' compensation appeal addressed the proper date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) for an injured claimant. The court found the deputy's MMI determination internally inconsistent with medical evidence and reversed the decision, remanding for recalculation of temporary disability benefits.
The court reversed the deputy's MMI determination, finding it internally inconsistent with Dr. Hussey's unrefuted medical opinion. The court held that MMI did not occur until August 26, 1980, and that a stipulation cannot bind the deputy when facts presented at the hearing demonstrate good cause for modification and show variance with the stipulated terms.
[1] A deputy's finding of maximum medical improvement (MMI) is internally inconsistent when it conflicts with undisputed medical evidence establishing a later MMI date.
[2] A pretrial stipulation cannot be extended to embrace matters not included within its scope, especially when subsequent events demonstrate a need for modification.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The deputy's order is internally inconsistent. It found MMI occurred on November 26,1979; yet it accepted Dr. Hussey's 15% PPD rating given on August 26, 1980, which was a 10% increase over Dr. Hussey's earlier rating given on November 21, 1979. This increase in disability belies the deputy's MMI date.”
Establishes the logical flaw in the deputy's MMI determination—the acceptance of increased disability ratings contradicts the finding of MMI at an earlier date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEssie Woods was an injured worker in a workers' compensation case. Dr. Hussey, the treating physician, initially rated Woods with 5% permanent partial…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Woods, the claimant below, raises six points on appeal.
We reverse the deputy’s order and remand with instructions on three points of the six points raised and affirm the case on the remainder.
First, Woods contends that the deputy erroneously found that the claimant reached MMI on November 21, 1979, because the only competent evidence supporting this finding was Dr. Hussey’s opinion that MMI ultimately occurred on August 26, 1980.
We agree with appellant that based on the unrefuted opinion of Dr. Hus-sey and the deputy’s other findings, the claimant could not have reached MMI until August 26, 1980. The deputy’s order is internally inconsistent. It found MMI occurred on November 26,1979; yet it accepted Dr. Hussey’s 15% PPD rating given on August 26, 1980, which was a 10% increase over Dr. Hussey’s earlier rating given on November 21, 1979. This increase in disability belies the deputy’s MMI date.
The employer/carrier argues, however, that the claimant should be bound by her pretrial stipulation entered into on February, 1980, when she stipulated that MMI actually occurred on November 21, 1979.
Nevertheless, the record shows that the claimant’s injuries worsened after that date. A stipulation cannot be extended to embrace matters not included in the stipulation. See Metz Package Store v. Ransom, IRC Order 2-2625 (May 29, 1974).
Moreover, the employer/carrier did not object to the claimant presenting evidence at the compensation hearing as to the MMI date. A deputy should not bind himself to a stipulation if facts presented at the hearing are at variance with, and show good cause for modification of the stipulation. See Delta Drilling Co. v. Wells, IRC Order 2-3708 (February 22, 1979) (cert. den. 379 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1979)); Baird-Ray Datsun v. Butler, 400 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (Ervin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Because MMI, in this case did not occur until August 26, 1980, the claimant may possibly be entitled to additional temporary total and/or temporary partial disability benefits.
However, we caution that “there is no automatic relationship between temporary total disability and the achievement of maximum medical improvement. The key is capacity to return to work.” T.
G. Lee Foods, Inc. v. Walker, 395 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Accordingly, the deputy’s finding of MMI on November 21,1979, is reversed and the case is remanded with directions for August 26, 1980 to be entered as the correct date of MMI, and for a determination as to whether the claimant was TTD and/or TPD between November 21, 1979 and August 26, 1980. Also, on remand, the deputy should award the claimant’s attorney’s fees and costs (Points II and III) should the deputy enter such temporary award.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further consistent proceedings.
MILLS and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Spitzer v. Bartlett Bros. Roofing & Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 437 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…ulated three months benefits. A deputy is not required to accept a stipulation if the facts proven are at substantial variance with the stipulation and if good cause is shown for modification of the stipulation. Woods v. Greater Naples Care Center, 406 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). But stipulations of the parties are normally binding on the deputy, and a finding by the deputy that is at variance with a stipulation will ordinarily be overturned. Principe v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 156 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1963); W…
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Leila Fawaz v. Florida Polymers and Fiesco, 622 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ker Stevin Constr., 609 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“[a] [judge of compensation claims] is not required to follow a stipulation which is refuted by competent substantial evidence received at a hearing”); Woods v. Greater Naples Care Center, 406 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“[a] [judge of compensation claims] should not bind himself to a stipulation if facts presented at the hearing are at variance with, and show good cause for modification of the stipulation”), review denied, 413 So. 2d 876…
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Espada Enters., Inc. v. Spiro, 481 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…ulation that the shooting took place at the crime scene in Miami. Although a deputy is not bound by a stipulation if the evidence presented at the hearing is at variance with the facts recited in the stipulation, Woods v. Greater Naples Care Center, 406 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in the absence of any such contradictions or of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, or concealment, the deputy should honor the stipulated facts entered into between the worker or his representative and his employer. S…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baird-Ray Datsun & Lynn Underwriting Co. v. Butler, 400 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Geathers v. State, 395 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- T. G. LEE Foods, Inc. v. Walker, 395 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)