DALE DEAN GOINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Dale Dean Goins appealed his convictions for second-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and attempted involuntary sexual battery. The appellate court reversed the kidnapping conviction because the indictment failed to identify the specific felony that Goins allegedly intended to commit or facilitate, an essential element of the kidnapping charge under Florida law.
The trial court erred in not dismissing the kidnapping count because the indictment failed to identify or describe the felony that the defendant intended to commit or facilitate, which is an essential element of kidnapping under Florida law. The omission of this material element rendered the indictment vague and indefinite, depriving the defendant of adequate notice.
[1] An indictment for kidnapping must identify or describe the felony that the defendant allegedly intended to commit or facilitate, as this is an essential element of the cr…
[2] The omission of a material element from an indictment renders it so vague and indefinite as to mislead the defendant and prejudice the preparation of their defense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the indictment does not identify or describe the felony that appellant allegedly intended to commit or facilitate, which is an essential element of the crime of kidnapping”
Establishes that the court found the indictment fatally defective for failing to specify the intended felony
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGoins was indicted on multiple counts including second-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and attempted involuntary sexual battery inv…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Preparation Of Defense cases and more on FLexlaw
BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Dale Dean Goins appeals his convictions and sentences for second-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, and attempted involuntary sexual battery. He raises six points on appeal, one of which merits discussion: whether Count II of the indictment sufficiently alleged the crime with which appellant was charged. Our first impression was to affirm; however, based on Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), we reverse.
Count II of the indictment states, in pertinent part, that appellant
did, without lawful authority, forcibly, secretly, or by threat, kidnap, confine, abduct, or imprison Stephanie Michelle Hawkins, against the will of the said Stephanie Michelle Hawkins, with the intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony, contrary to Chapter 787.01, Florida Statutes. . . . (Emphasis added.)
The trial court erred in not dismissing this count against appellant because the indictment does not identify or describe the felony that appellant allegedly intended to commit or facilitate, which is an essential element of the crime of kidnapping. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.140(d)(1). The omission of such a material element rendered the indictment so vague and indefinite as to mislead appellant, prejudicing the preparation of his defense. Jones v. State, supra.
Although appellant was charged with other felonies in the same indictment, allegations in a multiple-count information or indictment must stand separately. State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977). The state filed a statement of particulars, but it does not cure the fundamental defect of failure to give appellant adequate notice of the charges. State v. Black, 385 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1980).
We note that appellant was given consecutive life sentences on the second-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery charges and fifteen years on the attempted sexual battery charge, also to run consecutively. Our reversal of the kidnapping count will merely eliminate one life sentence.
The remaining points argued by appellant have been considered and rejected. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence for kidnapping are reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the kidnapping charge.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Buddy Earl Justus v. State, 438 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1983)…ense proscribed by section 787.01(l)(a)2 and must be alleged. Here the indictment specified which of the four alternative kinds of criminal intent listed in the statute appellant acted with when he abducted the victim. We do not read Goins v. State, 406 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), and Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), as being based on a per se rule that a charge of kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)2 must set forth the specific felony which the accused intended to commit or facilitat…
Authorities Cited
- State v. DYE, 346 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1977)
- State v. Theron Black, 385 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1980)
- Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)