THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT LEE TAVEL, APPELLEE
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
The defendant was given a pre-Villery1 sentence of three years in the state prison to be followed by two years probation. He was released after serving only two years and two months of the three year term. In the order now under review, the trial court rejected the state’s position that the defendant was “on parole” for the remaining ten months and began the probationary term only at the conclusion of the full three years. Instead, it held that the two years of probation commenced upon Tavel’s release and accordingly dismissed as untimely an application to revoke his probation which was commenced more than two years later, although within five years of the original sentence. See Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). We agree with that conclusion and affirm. See Section 947.24, Florida Statutes (1977); Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla.1981); but cf. Lewis v. State, 402 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
Affirmed.
. Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Easton v. State, 472 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…he period of probation shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parol or gain-time allowances. . We note that the addition of this sentence in 1983 expressly confirms the holding of State v. Tavel, 407 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 417 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1982); but cf., Lewis v. State, 402 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Johnson v. State, 419 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), pet. for review denied, 427 So. 2d 737 (Fla.1983).…
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Johnson v. State, 419 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981); Lewis v. State, 402 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Thus, defendant’s term of probation began on January 31, 1980, when his parole expired, not when he was released on parole from prison. Defendant cites State v. Tavel, 407 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), to support his argument that his probation began immediately upon release from prison and not upon termination of parole. In Tavel the defendant’s probation began immediately upon his release from prison. There, however, it is no…
Authorities Cited
- Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)
- Lewis v. State, 402 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- White v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Carpenter v. State, 355 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)