LARRY DONALD RILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Riley challenges his sentence under the Youthful Offender Act as illegal under Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, which restricted split sentences combining incarceration and probation. The court holds that Villery's restriction applies only to specific statutory sentencing provisions and does not apply to sentences imposed under the Youthful Offender Act, which has its own statutory framework authorizing split sentences.
Villery's proscription against incarceration of one year or more as part of a split sentence applies only to sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2) of the Florida Statutes and does not restrict sentencing under the Youthful Offender Act. Riley's sentence is valid under section 958.05(2), which expressly permits up to four years imprisonment followed by up to two years in a community control program.
[1] A split sentence consisting of incarceration for a term of one year or more followed by probation is illegal only when imposed under specific sentencing statutes that do…
[2] A sentence imposed under the Youthful Offender Act, which includes incarceration for a period not exceeding four years followed by a period of community control, is valid…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Villery's proscription of incarceration which equals or exceeds one year as part of a split sentence alternative applies only to the sentencing techniques of sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979).”
Establishes the narrow scope of Villery's restriction to specific statutory provisions, not the Youthful Offender Act.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiley was charged with burglary and, after plea negotiations, entered a guilty plea. The trial court sentenced him under the Youthful Offender Act to …
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
This appeal raises the question of whether the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981), applies to a sentence imposed under the Youthful Offender Act.
The state charged appellant with burglary. After plea negotiations, he pled guilty to the charge, and the court sentenced him under the terms of the Youthful Offender Act, chapter 958, Florida Statutes (1979), to four years imprisonment in a youthful offender institution followed by one year of probation.1
Appellant argues that his sentence is illegal under Villery because his incarceration is for a term which exceeds one year followed by probation. We disagree. Villery’s proscription of incarceration which equals or exceeds one year as part of a split sentence alternative applies only to the sentencing techniques of sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979). The Villery court found that such incarceration could not have' been contemplated by the legislature in enacting those sections because it could require the concurrent operation of parole and probation for the same offense.
Appellant’s split sentence, however, is valid under the statutory scheme of the Youthful Offender Act. Section 958.05(2), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that:
(2) The court may commit the youthful offender to the custody of the department for a period not to exceed 6 years. The sentence of the court shall specify a period of not more than the first 4 years to be served by imprisonment and a period of not more than 2 years .to be served in a community control program. The defendant shall serve the sentence of the court unless sooner released as provided by law.
Clearly, the sentence is within the express parameters of the section. Moreover, it will create none of the problems of overlapping parole and probation examined in Villery because the Youthful Offender Act in essence combines the concepts of probation and parole in its community control program. See § 958.10, Fla.Stat. (1979).
AFFIRMED.
OTT and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . Since the trial judge referred to the Youthful Offender Act, we construe his imposition of probation to mean that appellant is to be placed in a community control program, which is the designation used by the act for supervision after incarceration.
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Spurlock v. State, 449 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…ration, therefore not subject to the trial court’s jurisdiction at that point. We reject Clem v. State, find the trial court had jurisdiction and affirm the revocation order. See Bowen v. State, 415 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) and Riley v. State, 407 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The defendant also asserts the trial court failed to give credit for time served. Because he did not raise this matter below, we reject his assertion, without prejudice to his right to present the issue to the trial court pursu…
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Patterson v. State, 408 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…that his sentences are illegal under Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981). Because we have recently held that the Youthful Offender Act creates a statutory exclusion to the ruling in Villery, Riley v. State, 407 So. 2d 967 (Fla.2d DCA 1981), we reject this argument. Accordingly, appellant’s judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED but the provision for a mandatory three years’ imprisonment is stricken. HOBSON, A.C.J., and OTT, J., concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)