IRBY SPROUSE, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
MARIAN M. SPROUSE, APPELLEE
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Irby Sprouse was convicted of indirect criminal contempt for violating a restraining order in a dissolution case. The key issue was whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the contempt charge after the underlying dissolution proceeding was transferred to another county. The court affirmed, holding that a court may retain jurisdiction over a criminal contempt proceeding even after transferring the underlying civil case.
The court held that the trial court properly retained jurisdiction to hear the indirect criminal contempt proceeding despite the transfer of the dissolution case to another county. A court may reserve jurisdiction over a criminal contempt charge separately from the underlying civil litigation.
[1] A court retains jurisdiction to hear an indirect criminal contempt charge even after the underlying dissolution proceeding has been transferred to another county.
[2] Indirect criminal contempt is an offense against the court itself, distinct from the case in chief.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Criminal contempt is separate and distinct from the case in chief. A criminal contempt, direct or indirect, is an offense against the court itself for which punishment is the penalty.”
Establishes the foundational distinction between criminal and civil contempt that determines jurisdictional retention authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSprouse was charged with indirect criminal contempt for violating a restraining order prohibiting him from harassing his wife during dissolution proce…
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FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Appellant, Irby Sprouse, Jr., was found guilty by the Circuit Court for Orange County of indirect criminal contempt and sentenced to serve three days in the county jail. He appeals from the judgment and sentence.
Appellant and appellee, Marian M. Sprouse, in a stipulated fact statement declare that appellant had been charged with indirect criminal contempt for violation of a restraining order which provided that he would not harm, harass, molest or annoy appellee during the pendency of dissolution proceedings. On September 10, 1980, the trial judge issued a rule to show cause why appellant should not be held in indirect criminal contempt. On October 8,1980, the dissolution proceeding was transferred from Orange County to Seminole County because proper venue was determined to be there. The trial judge specifically retained jurisdiction to hear the contempt charge.
Appellant objected to the contempt proceeding in Orange County contending that the court lost jurisdiction because the dissolution proceeding had been transferred. We disagree and affirm.
Appellant contends that Kern v. Kern, 309 So. 2d 563 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), provides the applicable rule in this case. Kern was also a dissolution case. Mrs. Kern had allegedly violated a restraining order. The Palm Beach Circuit Court, upon motion for change of venue, transferred the case to Collier County specifically retaining jurisdiction to hear the contempt proceeding. The Second District Court of Appeal held that the Palm Beach court lacked the power to reserve jurisdiction for that purpose because of the transfer. While it would seem that Kern is directly in point, we have concluded that it is not. While the facts are not clear in Kern, we believe that it involved civil rather than criminal contempt. The proceeding there was instituted by the husband filing a motion for contempt, the method used for enforcement of the court’s orders by civil contempt. See Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570 and form 1.982. We agree that in such matters, because continuing compliance is the objective, the contempt proceeding should be a part and parcel of the parent litigation.
Criminal contempt is separate and distinct from the case in chief. A criminal contempt, direct or indirect, is an offense against the court itself for which punishment is the penalty. An indirect criminal contempt proceeding is not instituted by motion of a party but by motion of the court or affidavit of any person having knowledge of the facts. The court then issues and signs an order to show cause. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.840(a)(1).
We conclude therefore that it was altogether proper for the Orange County Circuit Court to hear the indirect criminal contempt.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.
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Guntner v. Shana Perry Jennings, 980 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…in the action.... ” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h). On the other hand, a civil contempt proceeding “is instituted and tried as a part of the main ease.” South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 88 [*1187] So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla.1956); see also Sprouse v. Sprouse, 408 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); 11 Fla. Jur.2d Contempt § 24 (2008). Special venue statutes apply to petitions seeking to modify child custody and child support orders. Under section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2007): The circuit court in the county i…
Authorities Cited
- Kern v. Kern, 309 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)