SAMUEL E. STEPHENSON, APPELLANT,
v.
DOROTHEA C. STEPHENSON, APPELLEE
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A husband appeals a trial court's denial of his petition to modify alimony payments in a 1970 divorce decree. The appellate court affirms, holding that the husband failed to establish sufficient changed circumstances to justify modification and that the wife's employment at a modest income level does not constitute grounds for termination of alimony.
The modification petition should be denied because the husband failed to establish a material change in circumstances, and the wife's modest employment income does not justify termination or reduction of alimony payments. No evidence supported a finding that the parties had waived or impliedly waived their right to seek modification.
[1] A party's right to seek modification of a final dissolution decree is subject to intentional or implied waiver.
[2] The totality of language in a settlement agreement may indicate an intent to waive the right to modification, even without a clear-cut waiver clause.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1979), provides the parties have the right to seek modification of a final dissolution decree. This right, however, is subject to intentional or implied waiver.”
Establishes the general right to modification and its limitations through waiver doctrine
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced in 1970 with a decree requiring the husband to pay $675 monthly alimony during his life; the husband earned $40,000 annually…
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PER CURIAM.
The husband appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for modification of alimony payments. We affirm.
The parties were divorced by final decree entered on March 18, 1970. The decree provided the husband would pay, during his life, $675.00 each month for the wife’s support and maintenance. At the time of the divorce, the husband earned $40,000 per year. The wife was not employed.
On February 6, 1980, the husband petitioned for modification asserting he had just entered private medical practice and that his wife was now employed and earning $13,000 per year. On January 21, 1981, the trial court entered an order denying the petition for modification holding the parties failed to establish cause for modification and that the parties waived their right to modification under the dictates of Lee v. Lee, 157 Fla. 439, 26 So. 2d 177 (1946).
Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1979), provides the parties have the right to seek modification of a final dissolution decree. This right, however, is subject to intentional or implied waiver. Turner v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Vogel, 195 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). In Lee, the parties agreed the husband would, “during his life” pay alimony based upon a complicated schedule which varied with the husband’s ability to produce income. Based on the entirety of the circumstances, the court noted the only logical construction of the stipulated settlement was that the parties had “forever settled” the amount the wife would receive.
This emphasis on the totality of the circumstances was underscored in Turner, supra, at 704, where the court noted the Lee opinion “does not indicate that the agreement before the court contained a clearcut waiver; however, the court found that the totality of language pointed toward an intent to waive.” We have reviewed the record and have found no evidence of an agreement to waive or conduct which would imply a waiver. The order, however, also specifies there was no change of circumstances which could justify a modification. We agree and note particularly that the wife should not be faced with the prospect of losing her right to alimony simply because she began earning a modest income. Mosher v. Mosher, 321 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Accordingly, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., and SHAW and JOANOS, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…We think otherwise. In our view, the significant factor in the Lee agreement was the provision for a sliding scale of alimony, which included a maximum amount, related to any increments in the husband’s future income. Thus, Stephenson v. Stephenson, 408 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), states that [i]n Lee, the parties agreed the husband would, “during his life” pay alimony based upon a complicated schedule which varied with the husband’s ability to produce income. Based on the entirety of the circumstances,…1 / 2
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Newsome v. Newsome, 456 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…specifically expressed by clear language evidencing an intent to waive all such rights in the future. E.g., Turner v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 424 So. 2d 32, 34, n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 408 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Similarly, the provisions of the final judgment whereby the court retained jurisdiction to enforce and modify all provisions of the final judgment (except paragraph 1, dissolving the marriage) is inconsistent with any constructi…
Authorities Cited
- Lee v. Manfred B. Lee, 157 Fla. 439 (Fla. 1946)
- Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Vogel, 195 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Turner v. Evabel M. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Mosher v. Mosher, 321 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)